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COMMON SENSE AND THE LAW OF “VOLUNTARY” 
CONFESSIONS: AN ESSAY 
John C. Sheldon* 
INTRODUCTION:  RASKOLNIKOV AND STATE V. WILEY 
By admitting to the police Inspector that he murdered two people, Raskolnikov 
delivers literature’s most famous criminal confession. The Inspector has done 
virtually nothing to procure the confession; all he did was tell Raskolnikov that he 
knows Raskolnikov committed the murder.  The marvel of Crime and Punishment is 
its exploration of Raskolnikov’s relentless, multi-faceted conscience, which alone 
drives him to admit his guilt.1 
Would Raskolnikov’s confession be admissible under Maine law?  It depends.  
Here, from its 2013 decision in State v. Wiley,2 is how the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, sitting as the Law Court, states the pertinent law: 
A confession is admissible in evidence only if it was given voluntarily, and the State 
has the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt 3 
. . . A confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if 
it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances 
its admission would be fundamentally fair.4  
Whether Raskolnikov’s confession is the product of “the free choice of a rational 
mind” hinges on one’s point of view.  Yes, because the Inspector did not provoke it.  
No, because Raskolnikov was mentally tortured, and a confession induced by torture 
cannot be a “free” choice.  Given that the State has to prove the voluntariness of 
Raskolnikov’s confession “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the chances are that 
                                                                                                     
 *  J.D., Washington & Lee School of Law, 2005; Judge, Maine District Court, 1987-2002; Visiting 
Scholar, Harvard Law School, 2000, 2002-3. 
  I owe thanks to many people.  Foremost, to Gail Hupper, who patiently critiqued drafts of the 
article and helped me improve it greatly.  Professor William Ickes of the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Texas at Arlington generously helped me understand “empathic inference.”  Peter L. 
Murray, who helped with the discussion of jury instructions.  Nancy Rabasca, librarian extraordinaire, 
supplied valuable research support.  Frank Underkuffler helped me through the morass of “free will.”  
And my favorite Queen of Espionage, Gayle Lynds, helped keep the whole thing coherent. 
 1.  Using Crime and Punishment as a point of takeoff was Maine Law School Professor Mel Zarr’s 
idea.  Thirty years ago I participated in a panel that discussed the law of voluntary confessions.  What 
prompted the colloquy was a recent Law Court decision suppressing a confessionState v. Caouette, 
which I discuss in note 186 infraand an article I’d published in the Maine Law Review criticizing the 
decision.  The defendant had confessed, without any inducement from law enforcement, out of a powerful 
sense of guilt.  Prof. Zarr wisely compared that circumstance with Raskolnikov’s.  Enough has been 
written about the American law of voluntary confessions to fill an encyclopedia.  I read some of those 
authorities when I wrote that article, and my learning then is the foundation for this piece.  I will not cite 
again, here, the authorities I relied upon then, because they’re in that article for anyone to find. 
 2.  2013 ME 30, 61 A.3d 750. 
 3.  Id. ¶ 15 (citing State v. McCarthy, 2003 ME 40, ¶ 12, 819 A.2d 335). 
 4.  Id. ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983)). 
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Raskolnikov wins the motion to suppress in our Law Court.5 
What provokes this article is the fact that nothing justifies suppressing the 
confession. Wiley extends the Law Court’s history of unsound jurisprudence in this 
field. 
The court’s view of the law is flawed for five reasons.  First, its definition 
requires the State to prove that the confession “results from the free choice of a 
rational mind.”  As I will explain, “the free choice of a rational mind,” and its 
correlatives, “free will” and “voluntariness,” are undefinable; proving the 
undefinable is a futility. Second, if proving the undefinable is futile, proving it 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” as the State must, is immeasurably futile.   Third, even 
if “voluntariness” were definable, objectively determining whether someone else’s 
behavior was “voluntary” is impossible.  Fourth, what “coercive” police conduct 
means, how much is too coercive, and whether something is “fundamentally fair,” 
are pure value judgments, and not given to factual proof.  Fifth, the Law Court has 
jeopardized “the security of all”6 in Maine by spiritualizing the Fifth Amendment.  
Excluding the impossible, the inapposite, and the unjustified, the standard 
should be amended thus: 
The State has the burden of persuasion that, under all of the circumstances, the 
admission of a confession would be fundamentally fair. 
The “voluntariness” doctrine is the creation of the United States Supreme Court.  The 
Law Court acknowledges the former’s controlling authority in this field but decided, 
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s license, to augment the federal burden of proof—a 
preponderance—by requiring the prosecution to prove “voluntariness” beyond a 
reasonable doubt.7  Neither the Supreme Court’s approach to this issue, nor the Law 
Court’s, deserves approbation.8  And although I have no expectation that this article 
will persuade the federal courts to alter their doctrine—they’re wedded to “free will” 
and divorce is unlikely—I urge the Law Court to alter its own.  I have entitled this 
piece an “essay” because my objective is not especially academic.  I want to explain 
why the court’s confession law doesn’t work, and to suggest improvements.   
I begin by discussing what “free choice of a rational mind” means.  I propose 
that we don’t know.  I then focus on Wiley, and explain why neither the majority 
opinion nor the minority opinion is persuasive.  Part III discusses why the Supreme 
Court’s approach to confessions is equally unpersuasive.  In Part IV I criticize the 
Law Court’s decision to raise the prosecution’s burden of proving “voluntariness” to 
the criminal standard, and I end by explaining that the only way we can reasonably 
attempt to determine why a defendant decided to confess is if the defendant tells us. 
                                                                                                     
 5.  There is federal precedent to the contrary:  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); see the 
discussion in the text infra accompanying note 122.  However, the Law Court has declared a confession 
that was offered under similar circumstances inadmissible under the authority of the Maine Constitution.  
State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982).  That decision has never been overruled.  See the 
discussion in note 186 infra. 
 6.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503, 515 (1963)). 
 7.  See infra Part IV of this Article. 
 8.  The “voluntariness” test has been described by commentators as “useless,” “elusive,” and 
“double-talk.”  See WAYNE LAFAVE, 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(b) (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
LAFAVE]. 
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I.  THE “FREE CHOICE OF A RATIONAL MIND” 
Voluntary confession law assumes a person possesses free will—an 
unadulterated freedom of self-controlthat the interrogation by the police then 
adulterates. 
The phrase “free choice of a rational mind” is the Law Court’s formula 
representing that pre-existing freedom of self-control.  In what follows I mean to 
demonstrate that the formula is illusory.  The bottom line is that free willthe 
foundational concept supporting the “free choice of a rational mind”cannot be 
defined and may not exist. 
To demonstrate why this is so, I start at the end of the phrase and work forward:  
first, what does “rational mind” mean; then what does “choice of a rational mind” 
mean; finally, how do we interpret “free choice of a rational mind”? 
A.  Rational Mind. 
My dictionary9 offers, among several other choices, the following.  For 
“rational,” it suggests “based on reasoning, not foolish or silly, sensible.”10  For 
“mind,” it offers, “intellect, intelligence, consciousness, psyche, memory, reason.”11  
The implication is that “rational mind” involves reasoning and intelligent processes.  
But not all intelligent behavior is based on reasoning: consider religious faith and 
altruism.  Moreover, some intelligent behavior can be unwiseconsider 
courageand intelligent, reasonable people are capable of behaving irrationally.  
Finally, we have cause to doubt we know how “intelligent” our “intelligence” 
issomething the rest of this portion of the article addresses.  For now, suffice it to 
say we think we know what “rational mind” means, but we may not. 
B.  Choice of a Rational Mind. 
Plainly, for “rational mind” to have legal significance it must have a meaning 
that exceeds the mere combination of definitions.  The obvious candidate as the 
source of such meaning is the noun that next precedes “rational mind” in the doctrinal 
phrase, i.e. the “choice” of a “rational mind.”  
The term “choice” suggests a calculation, perhaps a cost-benefit analysis, like 
this: “They want me to confess.  Should I?  And why should I?  Is it in my interest 
to do so?”  
The analysis cannot rest there however, for reasons illustrated by Brown v. 
Mississippi:12 
[A]bout one o'clock p.m. on Friday, March 30, 1934. . . .  one Dial, a deputy sheriff, 
accompanied by others, came to the home of Ellington, one of the defendants, and 
requested him to accompany them to the house of the deceased, and there a number 
of white men were gathered, who began to accuse the defendant of the crime [of 
murder]. Upon his denial they seized him, and with the participation of the deputy 
they hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and, having let him down, they hung 
                                                                                                     
 9.  WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (1958) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S]. 
 10.  Id. at 1496.   
 11.  Id. at 1144.  
 12.  297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936). 
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him again, and when he was let down the second time, and he still protested his 
innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and, still declining to accede to the 
demands that he confess, he was finally released, and he returned with some 
difficulty to his home, suffering intense pain and agony. The record of the testimony 
shows that the signs of the rope on his neck were plainly visible during the so-called 
trial. A day or two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to 
the home of the said defendant and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner 
towards the jail in an adjoining county, but went by a route which led into the State 
of Alabama; and while on the way, in that state, the deputy stopped and again 
severely whipped the defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping until 
he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to such a statement as the 
deputy would dictate, and he did so, after which he was delivered to jail.13 
More suspects were rounded up, and all were tortured.  Not surprisingly, they all 
“chose” to confessthey engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, and the immediate 
benefit of confessing outweighed whatever the cost might become.  And their 
decisions were certainly the “choice of a rational mind,” because they were “based 
on reason, not foolish or silly, sensible.”14 
Does the fact that they “chose” to confess make any difference to the 
admissibility of their confessions?  Certainly not: it’s immaterial, because whipping 
someone is intolerable.  So “choice of a rational mind” cannot be a test of 
voluntariness and, therefore, cannot provide the meaning we’re looking for.  The 
essential term we’re looking for must be the only one left in the phrasethe “free 
choice of a rational mind.”   
C.  Free Choice of a Rational Mind. 
What is a “free” choice?  To interpret “free” I again resorted to the dictionary.  
There was a multitude of definitions, but the following seemed the most helpful: 
[N]ot under the control of some other person or arbitrary power; able to act or think 
without compulsion or arbitrary restriction; not restricted by anything except its own 
limitations or nature, as free will.15 
What jumps out from that series of definitions is the idea of artificial force: “arbitrary 
power,” “compulsion,” and “restriction.”  And that certainly fits the lesson of Brown 
v. Mississippi: 
Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions 
so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It 
was the chief inequity, the crowning infamy of the Star Chamber, and the 
Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The Constitution recognized the evils that 
                                                                                                     
 13.  Id. at 281-82. 
 14.  The Supreme Court suppressed all confessions in the case: “[T]he freedom of the State in 
establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of 
due process of law. Because a State may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute 
trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand.”  Id. at 285-86. 
 15.  WEBSTER’S, supra note 9, at 729. 
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lay behind these practices and prohibited them in this country.16 
So it appears that the “freedom” we’re focusing on involves the absence of 
compulsion.   
This, however, raises another question: compulsion from what source?  As 
Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, “[t]here is torture of mind as well as 
body.”17  Brown exemplifies the latter, Crime and Punishment the former because 
the Inspector left Raskolnikov to stew in his own juices.  What produced the famous 
confession was an internal force: the irresistible pressure of Raskolnikov’s own 
conscience, exclusive and internal to him.  In order to understand whether 
Raskolnikov’s decision to confess was “voluntary,” therefore, we must know 
whether it was “free.” 
1.  Internal Force. 
Do internal forces such as Raskolnikov’s play a part in our analysis of “the free 
choice of a rational mind”?  Here I explain why no answer currently exists.   
I will illustrate the problem on three levels:  the psychological, the scientific, 
and the philosophical.  But first, this proviso:  What follows is an extreme 
simplification of a gargantuan conundrumgraduate school thesis material, at least.  
My objective is limited to illustrating why it is fruitless to try proving “free will” and 
its correlative, the “free choice of a rational mind.”   
a.  The Psychological Definition of Free Will 
Everyone “suffers” from something; a few common examples are shyness, a 
desire to be liked, lack of self-confidence, shame, and hot-headedness.  Alice Munro, 
I think, said it best: “[W]hatever troubled him and showed in his face might have 
been just the same old trouble—the problem of occupying space in the world.”18  
Take, for instance, the desire to be liked.  Suppose a suspect’s need for approbation 
is strong enough to be called an obsession, a result of having been neglected as a 
child.  Assume that a law enforcement officer has “questioned” the suspect: they run 
into each other when she’s paying a parking ticket at the police station and he asks 
her what happened.  Suppose further that she confesses to having done something 
wrong, solely because she seeks the officer’s approval for being honest.  Is that a 
“free” act?  To put the question another way, at what point does an emotional 
predisposition or a mental disorder deprive us of “freedom”?   
It takes an arbitrary judgment to answer that question.  To illustrate, try 
distinguishing those conditions that do not impair “free choice,” from those that do, 
in the following list of “disorders” found in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual V (DSM V):19  
                                                                                                     
 16.  297 U.S. at 287 (citation omitted). 
 17.  Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 605 (1961). 
 18.  “The Love of a Good Woman,” in FAMILY FURNISHINGS: SELECTED STORIES, 1995-2014 (Knopf 
2014) at 32. 
 19.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th 
ed. 2013). 
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 Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (predominantly hyperactive/impulsive 
presentation): symptoms include difficulty sustaining attention, subject does 
not seem to listen when spoken to directly, avoids tasks that require sustained 
mental effort, talks excessively, blurts out answers before the questions are 
finished.20 
 Bipolar I disorder (mild), depressive episode, with mixed features: elevated, 
expansive mood, more talkative than usual, excessive involvement in 
activities that have a high potential for painful consequences.21 
 Premenstrual dysphoric disorder: marked depressed mood, anxiety, a sense of 
being overwhelmed or out of control.22 
 Depressive disorder due to another medical condition: significant impairment 
in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.23 
 Generalized anxiety disorder: excessive anxiety about a number of activities, 
accompanied by difficulty concentrating and irritability.24  
 Agoraphobia: anxiety about being in places or situations from which escape 
might be difficult or may not be available.25 
 Acute stress disorder: inability to experience positive emotions, altered sense 
of the reality of one’s surroundings, efforts to avoid external reminders that 
arouse distressing memories of traumatic events.26 
 Unspecified neurocognitive disorder: “symptoms characteristic of a 
neurocognitive disorder that cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning 
predominate but do not meet the full criteria for any of the disorders in the 
neurocognitive disorders diagnostic class.”27 
 Mild frontotemporal neurocognitive disorder:  “behavioral disinhibition, 
apathy . . . prominent decline in language ability, in the form of . . . word 
comprehension.”28   
 Antisocial personality disorder: “impulsivity or failure to plan ahead . . . 
reckless disregard for safety of self . . . consistent irresponsibility.”29 
This far-from-exhaustive list—the text of the DSM V is over 800 pages long—
illustrates the problem: to debate whether a person’s particular mental condition or 
combination of conditions permits the person’s decision to be “free,” or renders it 
“unfree,” is like asking whether light is a wave or a particle.30  
What, therefore, does the Law Court require the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt?  Is it that the declarant does not possess any of the conditions 
                                                                                                     
 20.  Id. ICD-9-CM 314.01 at 59-60.   
 21.  Id. ICD-9-CM 296.41 at 149-50. 
 22.  Id. ICD-9-CM 625.4 at 171-72. 
 23.  Id. ICD-9-CM 293.83 at 180. 
 24.  Id. ICD-9-CM 300.02 at 222. 
 25.  Id. ICD-9-CM 300.22 at 217-18. 
 26.  Id. ICD-9-CM 308.3 at 280-81. 
 27.  Id. ICD-9-CM 799.59 at 643. 
 28.  Id. ICD-9-CM 780.09 at 614-15. 
 29.  Id  ICD-9-CM 301.7 at 659. 
 30.  Or both.  The Supreme Court managed to avoid this issue by declaring that, absent any attempt 
to induce a confession by the police, there is no “state action” that warrants the exclusion of the statement 
on constitutional grounds.  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986).  Whether the confession 
is admissible for its probative value is a different question.   
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described in the DSM V, or perhaps only one or two, and if so which ones?  Is it only 
those that interfere with “free will”?  If so, which are they?  How much interference 
is allowed?  The Law Court has never said. 
b.  The Scientific Concept of Free Will 
In a recent experiment by John-Dylan Haynes,31 subjects were given two buttons 
and told to make up their minds about which button to push, and then once they’d 
decided, immediately to push it.  Using a form of MRI, Haynes discovered that: 
[W]ithout realizing it, [about 20% of them] unconsciously formed prior-to-choice 
plans to push one of the two buttons.  They unconsciously stored this information in 
their brains, and then when the time came, these plans were activated. . . . The claim 
is that all of us sometimes fail to be free.  We are all sometimes driven by things like 
unconscious plans.  But we aren’t always driven by such things.32 
As scientific analysis of brain function improves, so will experiments about free will, 
and it is certain that within a generation or two we will understand our minds better.  
But for now, we’re on notice that we exercise conscious choice perhaps only 80% of 
the time.  If by “free” choice we mean one that results from conscious 
functioningand I believe we mustwe can’t prove to better than an 80% certainty 
that a choice was “free.”  Such a 20% margin of error precludes proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.33  And, for all the reasons I’m explaining in Part I of this article, 
we’re still left with the problem of knowing how much if any of that 80% is “free.”  
c.  The Philosophical Concept of Free Will 
The only things I’ve ever found more difficult to understand than the philosophy 
of free will are (1) quantum mechanics and (2) Finnish grammar.34  What follows is 
a brief description of some of the many philosophical approaches to free will.35   
i.  Determinism, or Why I Hate Onions. 
When I was a young child, my grandmother served me what she considered her 
specialty: boiled onions.  It was the first time I’d had onions, and I didn’t like the 
tastein fact, I can recall gagging on the first one.  Of course, being of the old 
                                                                                                     
 31.  Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes, Unconscious 
Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 2008 (Apr. 13, 2008), 
http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v11/n5/full/nn.2112.html.  I initially found reference to this study 
in MARK BALAGUER, FREE WILL (MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series, 2014) [hereinafter 
BALAGUER], and my description of it is Balaguer’s. 
 32.  BALAGUER, supra note 31, at 109-10. 
 33.  I will not attempt to quantify reasonable doubt.  Suffice it to say that an 80% chance you’re right 
may be good betting odds, but hardly proof to “a moral certainty.” See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 2497 at 405 (Chadbourn ed., 1981). 
 34.  Some people, especially Finns, claim they understand Finnish grammar.  But then some people 
claim they understand particle physics, too. 
 35.  The discussion of determinism, randomness, and non-randomness are based on Balaguer’s book, 
supra note 31 except for the quotation from Robert Kane, Libertarianism, in FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL 
5 (2007), and the text accompanying note 38. 
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school, my grandmother insisted that I eat them all, which didn’t help because not 
only did I dislike them initially, but I really disliked them thereafter.   
What caused my original gag response to onions?  Who knows?  Why can’t I 
stand them now?  Because I never could, or maybe because I resent my grandmother 
having forced them down my throat.  So if I’m at some friends’ house and they offer 
me onions, do I exercise free will by accepting or rejecting them?  Certainly not if I 
reject them.  And if I elect to eat them, it might be because (1) my mother taught me 
always to accept food because it’s good manners, or (2) I don’t ever want to 
disappoint a host, or (3) I fear the disapproval of others so I will eat onions if the 
others do.  Under those circumstances, I’m not exercising free will because 
something in my background controls any choice I make.36   
If I’m asked to confess to a crime, the same may be true: something historical in 
me controls the choice. 37   If so, Wiley’s “free choice of a rational mind” cannot 
occur.  
ii.  Randomness: Flipping a Coin. 
A second interpretation of free will is the case of someone who’d neither tasted 
onions nor had any other experience with them, first- or second-hand (i.e., a friend 
hadn’t told him or her they’re delicious), was hungry enough to try them, and had no 
subconscious directive one way or another; faced with a choice between eating 
onions or not, he or she just flips a coin or rolls a die. 
To a degree, randomness does enhance the argument for free will because rolling 
the die, and delegating the choice to something external and uncontrollable, was the 
person’s choice.  Or maybe not: 
Suppose a choice was the result of a quantum jump or other undetermined event in 
a person’s brain.  Would this amount to a free and responsible choice?  
Undetermined effects in the brain or body would be unpredictable and 
impulsivelike the sudden emergence of a thought or the uncontrolled jerking of 
an armquite the opposite of what we take free and responsible actions to be.  [Such 
spontaneous events] would be more likely to undermine our freedom [i.e. our free 
will] than enhance it.38 
However one characterizes them, random acts can’t be what the Law Court means 
by “the free choice of a rational mind.”  
iii.  Non-randomness:  The Fork in the Road. 
It is also possible to posit that decisions may be made that aren’t related to one’s 
background—i.e., aren’t deterministic—but that aren’t random either.  Here’s an 
illustration:  I’m driving down a road I’ve never been on before, and I come to an 
                                                                                                     
 36.  What if I accepted onions because (1) I wanted to see if my taste has changed, or (2) I didn’t want 
to leave on an empty stomach?  Are those choices determined by my background, or do they form 
boundaries within which I may exercise free will?  See infra note 44 and accompanying text for the 
discussion about compatibilism. 
 37.  For several additional examples of this phenomenon, see infra, Part II, subsection B. 
 38.  Kane, supra note 35, at 9. 
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unmarked fork in the road.  Both options look equally wide, well-paved, and well-
travelled, I have no idea which one I should take to get to my destination, and a pulp 
truck39 is bearing down on me from behind so I have to do something quick.  
Whichever fork I take, it cannot be said that my decision will be deterministically 
caused.  Nor will it be random, because it won’t simply happen to me; I won’t roll a 
die and let the die decide what I should do.  It is I who will choose what to do.  I 
realize my decision will be arbitrary and I will make a decision anyway.  I 
consciously control the decision.40 
Let me apply that to the confession problem.  Assuming that the fork-in-the-
road metaphor describes someone’s decision to confess, can such a decision ever be 
“the free choice of a rational mind”?  To put it another way, does our court really 
require the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s choice 
was capricious? 
iv.  Libertarianism:  The Boston Marathon Bomber.41 
The classic view of free will is the libertarian concept, which associates the 
exercise of free will with moral responsibility.  Free will, from this view, is our 
conscience—what the Russian Inspector expected would drive Raskolnikov to 
confess. 
Relying on a libertarian concept of free will is common.  Consider the Boston 
Marathon bomber, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.  If the determinists are right, Tsarnaev 
couldn’t help it.  Everything he did was pre-determined by culture, psychological 
predispositions, bad role models, DNA-driven instinct, and so on.  But nobody is 
willing to believe that.  We believe he could have helped it and should have done so.  
In other words, we believe that there’s a significant element of human behavior that 
cannot be deterministic: we have abilities beyond whatever we’ve been programmed 
to do.  This concept of free will, in Tsarnaev’s case, is necessary if we are to justify 
his execution.  
This is probably what judges have in mind when they talk about the “free choice 
of a rational mind”: leaving the decision to confess up to an individual’s sense of 
responsibility and preference.  
But there is this uncertainty: are we so sure Tsarnaev possessed the ability to 
have chosen to obey the law?  We assume we have moral standards of behavior 
because we have free will, but is the converse not equally possible?  Perhaps we need 
moral standards of behavior to quash anarchy so, in order to justify them, we assume 
free will exists?42  We’ve done something similar before: where did the Garden of 
Eden come from if not a socio-psychological need to vindicate our existence?  So, 
                                                                                                     
 39.  Because everyone in Maine knows what a pulp truck is, and because nobody outside of Maine is 
likely to read this article, I won’t explain it. 
 40.  Beware, however, of the possibility that my conscious control will not be that at all.  For example, 
what if, whenever as a child I was bad, my mother had always slapped my right hand, not my left one.  
Now, how much “control” will I have exercised if I take the left fork? 
 41.  In this portion of the article I rely on Kane, supra note 35.   
 42.  JONATHAN M.S. PEARCE, FREE WILL?  AN INVESTIGATION INTO WHETHER WE HAVE FREE 
WILL, OR WHETHER I WAS ALWAYS GOING TO WRITE THIS BOOK loc. 2043 (2010) (ebook). 
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have we invented free will—or do we hope it exists—to vindicate our condemning 
what the Tsarnaevs around us might otherwise do? Which is real: free will or the 
need to have it?43   
In a larger sense, do we ourselves have the “free will” to determine whether the 
libertarian theory is correct, or is our choice of that theory driven by the very nature 
of human society: the need to control individuals’ behavior? If so, the libertarian 
theory of “free will” is itself deterministic. 
Here is that question in the context of this article: does a person have a choice 
whether or not to confess, or do we pretend that the choice exists, without really 
knowing, in order to justify using the confession to convict?  I suspect the truth lies 
with the latter alternative. 
v.  Compatibilism: The Laptop.44 
At first glance, libertarianism and determinism seem incompatible.  How can we 
hold a criminal defendant morally responsible, under the former theory, if the 
defendant’s behavior was pre-determined and beyond the person’s control under the 
latter? 
Compatibilism maintains that libertarianism and determinism are just what the 
term suggests, harmonious.  There are many versions of compatibilism, including 
the following, an example based on an idea of John Locke (the laptop was my idea, 
not his).  A man is bedridden in a hospital room following an operation.  He considers 
walking out the door and down the hall to steal a laptop at the nurses’ station.  
 He decides not to try.  Unbeknownst to him, his physical condition would 
have prevented him from getting out of bed anyway.  
 He decides not to try.  Unbeknownst to him, the door is locked from the 
outside so he couldn’t have stolen the laptop if he’d tried. 
 He decides to try stealing the laptop.  However, as he’s getting out of bed 
he sees a sign on the door:  “Door locked; to exit call nurses.”  He stays 
in bed. 
 Finding the door locked, he picks the lock and steals the laptop. 
The fact of choosing—the “free will” component—occurs in each example, but the 
fact of doing occurs only in the fourth.  Whether he was aware of it or not, in each 
of the other examples something beyond the man’s control prevented or would have 
prevented the acting.  The converse is also possible:  One could also posit the case 
in which a person does something that is not his or her choice.45  In either event, 
                                                                                                     
 43.  If all we have is a need to control behavior, then perhaps we don’t have free will, right?  If we 
don’t have free will, Tsarnaev couldn’t help choosing to kill people, so it’s unjust for us to execute him, 
right?  Welcome to the debate about free will. 
 44.  The illustration here comes from John Martin Fischer, Compatibilism, in FOUR VIEWS ON FREE 
WILL 44, 57 (2007).  My description of compatibilism will probably horrify compatibilists because of the 
degree to which I’ve simplified it, but I’m not writing for philosophers.  
 45.  Fisher tells of a “Frankfurt-example,” an invention of the contemporary philosopher Harry 
Frankfurt:  A person standing in a voting booth who up until now has been undecided is about to cast a 
vote for Republican Presidential candidate Mitt Romney.  Unknown to that person, a dyed-in-the-wool 
Democrat neuroscientist has planted a device in the voter’s brain that senses the imminence of such choice 
and countermands it.  The person thus votes for Obama.  The voter has thus done somethingvoted for 
a Democratwithout having chosen to do so.  Id. at 57-58. 
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compatibilism conjoins libertarianism—the power of choosing—with 
determinism—the impediment to the exercise of choice.   
For the purposes of this essay, compatibilism doesn’t help answer whether a 
suspect’s confession is the “free exercise of a rational mind” because we can’t tell 
whether (1) libertarian “free will” exists and (2) the “choice” to confess was a 
deterministic one.  
vi.  Recapping the Philosophies of Free Will.   
The foregoing discussion skims only a portion of the extensive surface of an 
enormously profound subject. I have avoided Kant, Spinoza, Hobbes, Aquinas, 
Plato, Popper, Rousseau, and Aristotle (among a boatload of other philosophers).  I 
have stayed away from the arcana of “free will” debates, such as hard 
incompatibilism, causal reductionism, non-reductive physicalism, revisionism, 
positivism, recurring patterns of embodied experience, and “P Nfc” (among a 
separate boatload of other concepts).46  And then there’s quantum mechanics, which 
I reference a couple of times in this article (and from which I then flee). 
Does Maine adhere to any of the foregoing theories of free will?  I’d guess 
libertarianism, but one reviews Law Court decisions in vain to find any such election, 
or even concern about it. 
d.  Summary:  The “Free Choice of a Rational Mind” Tells Us Nothing About 
Internal Coercion. 
The Law Court’s “free will” analysisif “analysis” is an appropriate 
termfails psychologically, scientifically, and theoretically.  For the purpose of 
deciding the critical issue of whether highly probative evidence may be used in 
criminal trials, it is useless.  So I urge that we cease employing “free will,” “free 
choice of a rational mind,” and “voluntariness” as the basis for determining the 
admissibility of confessions.   
2.  Forces Internal to the Person, and External to the Person, Combined. 
Raskolnikov’s was an unusual case: a suspect who confesses without any 
inducement from the police.  Now add official participation: does our assessment of 
the declarant’s “voluntariness” change?  Obviously not: except in occasional cases, 
such as Brown, the addition of an external force doesn’t endow us with a greater 
ability, or additional tools, to analyze what occurs internally.  The only thing we can 
measure is what we can observe, record, and catalog: (1) the behavior of the police 
and (2) the behavior of the declarant.47   
II.  VOLUNTARINESS AND THE PROBLEMS WITH WILEY 
State v. Wiley was not a unanimous decision.  Justice Levy wrote for the four-
                                                                                                     
 46.  See generally JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR., GERMAIN GRISEZ & OLAF TOLLEFSEN, FREE CHOICE:  A 
SELF-REFERENTIAL ARGUMENT (1976); NANCEY MURPHY & WARREN S. BROWN, DID MY NEURONS 
MAKE ME DO IT? (2007); Kane, supra note 35.    
 47.  We can consider the defendant’s inner psychological, psychiatric, and emotional goings-on if he 
or she will enable us to do so.  See the discussion in Part V of this article.  
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Justice majority and was principally concerned with the interrogating officer’s 
conduct.  Justice Alexander wrote for the three dissenters; he criticized the majority 
for focusing on the officer’s conduct, and argued that what counts most is the 
declarant’s state of mind.   
I disagree with both of the opinions, for reasons that follow. But first, let me 
outline the case. 
A.  Wiley’s Facts and Opinions. 
William Wiley was convicted of having had sexual contact with his stepdaughter 
when she was approximately twelve years old.48   
Sheriff’s detective Jason Bosco had met Wiley at his home, told him he was 
investigating something, and asked him to ride with him back to the Sheriff’s 
Office.49  Wiley agreed.50  A recorded interview followed.51  Bosco told Wiley he 
was not under arrest and was free to leave whenever he wanted; Bosco did not read 
Wiley the Miranda warnings.52   
Soon after the interview began Bosco told Wiley “he knew that Wiley had 
molested the victim.”53  Wiley, who was a long-time elementary school teacher,54 
got upset, began sobbing, and  
eventually slid to the floor of the room in a fetal position while the questioning 
continued.   Approximately forty minutes into the interview, Wiley raised the 
prospect of being sent to jail, and the detective continued to urge Wiley to describe 
what he had done. Detective Bosco informed Wiley that he had two options: he 
could "own up" to his mistake and serve "a little bit of jail time" in county jail 
followed by probation, thus preserving his relationship with his son, or he could 
refuse to disclose the sexual contact with the victim and serve a sentence in state 
prison.55 
Writing for the majority, Justice Levy summed up what he considered to be the 
essence of the interrogation:   
[I]t is inescapable that the overall effect of Detective Bosco's representations—
which he alternately described as an "offer," "option," "opportunity," and chance to 
"write[] your own punishment”—was to establish that if Wiley confessed to the 
crimes he would get a short county jail sentence with probation, and thereby avoid 
state prison. Wiley was told, "[t]he only reason you're getting this opportunity is 
because people spoke very highly of you," and that "[t]his offer's going to expire if 
. . . you're not going to do the right thing."56 
Justice Levy concluded:   
                                                                                                     
 48.  State v. Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 2, 61 A.3d 752 
 49.  Id.  ¶ 3. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id.  ¶ 4. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 54.  See id. ¶ 44 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
 55.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 56.  Id. ¶ 25. 
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  Detective Bosco's concrete representation of a short jail sentence followed by 
probation in exchange for Wiley's cooperation was . . . the primary motivating force 
for the ensuing confession. 
  . . . .  
   . . . A confession is not voluntary where an interrogating officer, with no more 
than apparent authority, leads a suspect to believe that a confession will secure a 
favorable, concrete sentence, and that belief motivates the suspect to confess.57  
The confession being “involuntary,” it was therefore inadmissible. 
Justice Alexander wrote a dissent on behalf of himself and two other Justices, 
and offered this criticism of the majority decision: “[T]he Court has failed to focus 
on the critical aspect of the analysisWiley's state of mindand it has instead 
focused on the officer's statements.”58  He explains further in an accompanying 
footnote: “the decision regarding voluntariness requires an individualized 
assessment of the defendant's state of mind in the context of the officer's actions and 
conduct.”59  In addition, the dissent accused the majority of exceeding its authority:  
since there was adequate evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual 
findings, and precedent to support its legal conclusion, the obligation of the appellate 
court was to sustain the lower court’s ruling.  For both of those reasons, therefore, 
the dissenters would have found the confession “voluntary” and admissible. 
What prompted this article is my belief that the law cannot be what either 
opinion claimed it to be.  So I dispute the majority’s assertion that the State failed to 
meet its burden of proof.  I disagree with the dissent’s theory of the method by which 
a judge is supposed to determine whether a confession was “voluntary.”  And I 
dispute the assumption underlying both opinions that “the free choice of a rational 
mind” can be determined.  I will start by discussing the dissent, because therein lies 
my principal objection to Maine’s view of “voluntary” confessions.  
B.  The Dissent.   
I disagree with Justice Alexander’s position on two grounds.   
1. “Individualized Assessment.” 
First, I differ from Justice Alexander’s view that a court hearing a suppression 
motion must make “an individualized assessment of the defendant’s state of mind.”60 
What, exactly, should a trial court “assess”?  Should the record on Wiley’s 
appeal demonstrate that the trial court considered whether Wiley was Catholic and 
had been raised to confess his sins?  Would this have diminished Wiley’s dependency 
on the officer’s plea bargain offer enough to render his confession “voluntary”?  
(This notwithstanding the contradiction between determinism and free will.)  
Suppose Wiley lived in a small town, and the officer and the suspect were cousins, 
and the officer used to coach him on the little league baseball team.  Should the trial 
court have considered small-town dynamics?  Perhaps Wiley was so psychologically 
insecure that he was bound, under the slightest pressure, to expose his inner 
                                                                                                     
 57.  Id. ¶¶ 30-31 (citations omitted). 
 58.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 59.  Id. ¶ 32 n.7. 
 60.  Id. 
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thoughts?  If so, what prompted the confession was Wiley’s inner fragility, not 
Bosco’s offer of leniency.  (This notwithstanding the problem of distinguishing 
psychological predisposition from free will.)   
What, in fact, should a trial court not consider when making such an 
“individualized assessment of the defendant’s state of mind in the context of the 
officer’s actions and conduct”?  An “individualized assessment” thorough enough to 
provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt would include Wiley’s 
 predisposition to confess; 
 respect for authority;  
 respect for propriety;  
 discomfort in the presence of police;  
 aversion to deceit;  
 concern for his reputation for honesty; 
 concern for his job; 
 fear of punishment; 
 sadness;  
 shame; 
 guilty conscience; 
 hope that honesty would assuage his shame and guilt; 
 hope that honesty would get him a light sentence;  
 desire to please;  
 feelings of his own victimization if what he’d done had been done to him; and, 
if so,  
 sympathy for his victim;  
 desire to get the interrogation over with;  
 need for the companionship of someone more amiable than Detective Bosco, 
plus any other pertinent characteristics, plus, necessarily, the significant clinical 
features and psychological disorders one would expect of a person who had 
committed a sexual act against a child.  How the State would get this information, 
given the Fifth Amendment and the present state of Maine law, is undetermined,61 
but it must prove “voluntariness” beyond a reasonable doubt, so it would need 
someone qualified as an expert in this field to present such an assessment.  Assuming 
the prosecution has an expert armed with such information, Wiley would need to 
rebut with expert testimony of his own.  If Justice Alexander was correct, motions to 
suppress confessions need to be full-blown trials involving experts on both sides.  
But Justice Alexander cannot have been correct in any event.  Here is his 
opening description of the process by which a court determines whether a confession 
was “voluntary”: “The trial court may find a defendant's statements voluntary if it 
finds that the statement is the result of the defendant's ‘own free will and rational 
intellect . . . as opposed to one that results from threats, promises or inducements 
made to the defendant.’"62  
The implicit premise of that statement is that there is a starting point, a pre-
existing norm: the defendant’s “free will and rational intellect.”  The trial court’s job 
is to determine whether, and to what degree, the incipient state of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                     
 61.  See discussion infra in Part V of this article, where I offer a suggestion. 
 62. Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 33, 61 A.3d 750 (quoting State v. McCarthy, 2003 ME 40, ¶ 12, 819 A.2d 
335). 
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“free will and rational intellect” was altered by law enforcement’s behavior.  But 
how is the defendant’s incipient state to be discerned?  Doing what Justice Alexander 
suggested requires one to identify, define, and quantify the defendant’s “free will 
and rational intellect” ab initio, before the police started interfering with it.  That 
prerequisitethat absolute essentialand how to achieve it get no mention.  
Nor have they ever gotten mention.  As Justice Alexander illustrated through the 
precedents he cited in support of his argument,63 for decades the Law Court has been 
sending trial courts on a fool’s errand without referencing the prerequisite of the 
inquiry, the consequential magnitude of its mandate or, in the alternative, the simple 
impossibility of the task.  The Law Court has not contemplated the preliminary 
inquiry that its mandate requires.  Nor has it intended to turn motions to suppress 
into complex litigation.  It cannot have confronted the fact that, absent expert 
testimony, it has been requiring trial judges to declare a confession admissible only 
after determining the undeterminable—and, of course, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2.  Nonexistent Standards for Law Enforcement. 
My criticism of the dissent in Wiley extends beyond the impossibility of its 
directive.  If the appellate standard for admissibility pivots on the trial court’s 
“individualized assessment of the defendant’s state of mind,” the standard works an 
injustice on the public.  The public is entitled to effective law enforcement and, as 
Crime and Punishment famously illustrates, confessions are a significant law 
enforcement tool.64  But by making an “individualized assessment of the defendant’s 
state of mind” the standard for admissibility, the Law Court gives police and 
prosecutors no guidance whatsoever.  This contradicts the very purpose of 
“voluntary” confession law, because if the trial court, and then the Law Court, will 
look over an officer’s shoulder, after the fact, to “assess” the suspect’s “state of 
mind,” so, it seems, the officer must also, and constantly, “assess” the suspect’s 
“state of mind.”  But how?  What is the officer looking for?   
This the Law Court has never explained.  It is, however, something the Supreme 
Court sought to address in Miranda v. Arizona:65  
                                                                                                     
 63.  Justice Alexander cited four of them: State v. Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶¶ 18-21, 1 A.3d 
408 (affirming trial court findings that statements that officers could help defendant get treatment for his 
alcohol problem if he would “step up to the plate” and admit that he made a mistake did not render 
confession involuntary, although officers could not provide the promised treatment); State v. 
Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 57, 1 A.3d 445 (concluding that a police officer’s statement to the defendant that 
“the more cooperative you are, the better things are for you” was not a threat or promise of leniency) 
(alteration omitted); State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 908, 911 (Me. 1995) (concluding that a confession was 
voluntary when detectives, after repeatedly disclaiming any authority over sentencing, assured the 
defendant that he was not in trouble for possessing a handgun used in a murder); State v. Hutchinson, 597 
A.2d 1344, 1346 (Me. 1991) (concluding that even if a police officer’s statement to a defendant that telling 
the truth would “clear things up” constituted an implied promise, the confession was voluntary because 
the defendant “clearly considered whether speaking would be in his best interest, but he was simply wrong 
in his conclusion”). 
 64.  See the further discussion in the text infra accompanying note 141, concerning the Law Court’s 
inadequate reasons for raising the prosecution’s burden of proof from a preponderance to beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 65.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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[The Supreme] Court's effort to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the 
[confessing] defendant had acted out of free will had resulted in disaster. . . . Before 
Miranda the illusive and contradictory character of free will provided every 
defendant with an arguable claim that his or her will had been overborne. . . . By 
transmogrifying free will into the concrete warning-and-waiver procedure, the Court 
tamed the contradictions that would otherwise continually threaten the legitimacy 
of punishment in a liberal democracy. . . . An individual policeman, untrained in the 
philosophical intricacies of free will, now knew precisely what it was that he [or 
she] was supposed to do before talking to a suspect.66 
Our Law Court’s failure to have clarified this field of law for those who are required 
to apply it first-hand may be a symptom of the court’s four-decade-long disregard 
for the public interest in law enforcement in preference for individual defendants’ 
rights, which I discuss below.67 
C.  The Majority Decision. 
Justice Levy wrote for the majority, asserting that the State failed to meet its 
burden of proof that the defendant’s confession was “voluntary”: “[w]e would need 
to disregard both experience and common sense to conclude that Detective Bosco's 
concrete representation of a short jail sentence followed by probation in exchange 
for Wiley's cooperation was not the primary motivating force for the ensuing 
confession.”68 
Justice Levy could have concluded that: (1) the officer made an offer of leniency 
without the authority to guarantee it, and a confession ensued (irrespective of the 
defendant’s motivation); (2) doing that was improper; (3) such impropriety renders 
the confession inadmissible.  That is a straightforward rule and is supported by the 
facts in the record.  Moreover, it’s easy for the police to understand and for the courts 
to apply.  Had Justice Levy stopped there, I wouldn’t have written this article. 
But Justice Levy went further, attempting to associate the improper offer with 
the defendant’s motivation to confess.  What linked the offer to the confession was 
Justice Levy’s “experience and common sense” but, given the complexity of the 
human psyche, that’s unpersuasive.  Such complexity suggests an intricate 
combination of “motivating forces” within Wiley, including perhaps, but not 
necessarily limited to, his:  
 predisposition to confess; 
 respect for authority;  
 respect for propriety;  
 discomfort in the presence of police;  
 aversion to deceit;  
 concern for his reputation for honesty; 
 etc. (see above).  
Identifying one element that controlled the decision to confess is guesswork. 
                                                                                                     
 66.  Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 742-43, 746-47 (1992).  Of 
course Miranda didn’t resolve the enduring problem of deciding the “voluntariness” of a waiver of the 
rights. 
 67.  See infra Part IV.  
 68.  State v. Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 30, 61 A.3d 750. 
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An additional complication, of which Justice Levy was likely unaware, is the 
possibility that, and the degree to which, Wiley’s choice was deterministic. 
And there’s more.  For Justice Levy to have understood Wiley’s “motivation” 
he would also have had to understand how Wiley digested the information Bosco 
provided him with, which requires employing the language of human information 
processing: 
Human performance can be described either in terms of subjective experience or in 
terms of brain processes.  The language of human information processing provides 
a common vehicle for the integration of these two approaches.  On the one hand, 
information processing can be related to subjective experience, since verbal reports 
often serve as a method for accumulation of evidence and can be viewed as the 
output of a specialized processing system that has its own objective status within an 
information processing theory.  On the other hand, the language of information 
processing provides an analysis of psychology that is congenial to physiology 
because it places emphasis on different levels of processing and the time course of 
their activation.  Information processing language provides an alternative way of 
discussing internal mental operations intermediate between subjective experience 
and activity of neurons.69  
Assuming that Justice Levy did not consider the interface between Wiley’s 
subjective experience and his neural activity, and employed only “experience and 
common sense” to estimate the defendant’s mental process, Justice Levy could have 
hit upon Wiley’s particular—unique—motivation to confess only by an outside 
chance or if the defendant’s mind was sub-humanly unsophisticated.  It follows that 
our law of “voluntary” confessions operates by equally thin fortuity or at an equally 
unsophisticated level. 
I will leave this inquiry at this point, but resume it when I reconsider Justice 
Levy’s resort to “experience and common sense” as I compare Maine’s standard of 
“voluntariness” with the Supreme Court’s in a later portion of the article.70  There I 
also explain how, given the foregoing discussion, we nevertheless can determine 
mens rea.  
1.  Common Sense or Camouflage? 
As the title to this piece may suggest, I consider common sense an ultimate 
measure of good law.  So it may seem inconsistent for me to criticize Justice Levy’s 
express reliance on common sense, but I do so because I believe that “experience 
and common sense” merely camouflaged his purpose, for this reason: 
 The officer broke the rule about offering leniency.  That rendered the 
confession inadmissible.  But declaring probative evidence inadmissible in a 
criminal case is unjustifiable unless supported by policy.  It was necessary, 
therefore,  
 [t]o employ the language of voluntary confession law in order to assert that a 
                                                                                                     
 69.  MICHAEL I. POSNER, Information Processing, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PERCEPTION AND HUMAN 
PERFORMANCE, at V-3 (Kenneth R. Boff, Lloyd Kaufman & James P. Thomas, eds., John Wiley & Sons 
1986). 
 70.  See infra Part III(B), text accompanying note 101.  
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ruling of inadmissibility is founded on established, constitutional doctrine. 
This means Justice Alexander’s criticism of the majority opinion characterized it 
correctlyWiley’s “voluntariness” had nothing to do with itand that Justice 
Levy’s concluding paragraph, presented here in full, misstates the basis for the 
decision:   
A confession is not voluntary where an interrogating officer, with no more than 
apparent authority, leads a suspect to believe that a confession will secure a 
favorable, concrete sentence, and that belief motivates the suspect to 
confess.  Considering the circumstances as a whole, and mindful that it is the State 
that bore the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, we conclude 
that the finding that Detective Bosco “did not engage in any conduct or invoke any 
techniques that would render the defendant’s statements involuntary” was clear 
error.71 
First, Justice Levy did not know, or conscientiously attempt to know, what 
principally “motivate[d] the suspect to confess.”  Second, therefore, the decision was 
based entirely on the officer’s behaviorin this case, the unauthorized offer of 
leniency.72  Third, the reference to the prosecution’s burden of proof“mindful that 
it is the State that bore the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable 
doubt”was a formal gesture and immaterial to the decision because 
“voluntariness” was simply the packaging in which the decision was wrapped.73  
Fourth, the State actually met its burden of proof, because it proved the only thing 
that mattered, the facts: the interview was recorded and there was no doubt 
whatsoever about what the officer said to the suspect.   
It is disappointing that Justice Levy’s decision is so transparent.  Bereft of the 
ornament of “voluntariness,” the decision is sound: the officer crossed the line and 
the confession is inadmissible.  I do not mean to suggest that Justice Levy misapplied 
the law.  As I will explain in the next part of this article, he applied it in the only way 
that makes sense.  I criticize Justice Levy’s opinion, in part, because he didn’t 
acknowledge that. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFESSION LAW DOCTRINE 
Another reason why I criticize Justice Levy’s opinion is that he didn’t explain 
why the officer crossed the line.  It’s not, as Levy says, that the officer convinced 
Wiley to take the bait.  Rather, the reason is that Levy himself would have taken the 
bait.   
A.  The Supreme Court’s Definition of “Voluntariness”   
Let me begin to explain why by presenting part of the Supreme Court’s most 
elaborate explanation of “voluntariness,” from Justice Felix Frankfurter’s exegesis 
                                                                                                     
 71.  Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 31, 61 A.3d 750 (citations omitted). 
 72.  I’ve over-simplified here.  As I will explain infra in the text accompanying note 96, the decision 
was based on how the officer’s promise of leniency affected Levy.  
      73.   Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 31, 61 A.3d 750. 
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about “voluntary” confessions in Culombe v. Connecticut.74   
The starting point to determine whether a confession was “voluntary,” he said, 
is to consider “all of the circumstances” under which it was given.75  In confession 
law since Brown, that requirement has never been disputed.76  But then Justice 
Frankfurter said this: 
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in 
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the 
confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? 
If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will 
has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the 
use of his confession offends due process.77 
That suggests the inquiry must focus primarily on the consequence of the 
interrogation for the individual defendantwhat this particular person actually 
feltand only secondarily on what the police did to him or her.  It seems, therefore, 
that if the police were to use precisely the same interrogation method on two 
ostensibly identical people, one of them might confess “voluntarily” and the other 
“involuntarily.”  No matter how the police behaved, then, they would be incapable 
of protecting the admissibility of the confession they obtained. 
Or perhaps not?  How significant is the individual defendant?  To answer that 
question, consider the following.  Quoting again from Frankfurter’s Culombe 
opinion, it seems at first that everything pivots on how the particular defendant 
received and reacted to the words and behavior of the police: 
 “if he has willed to confess”;78 
 “if . . . his capacity for self-determination [has been] critically impaired”;79 
 “[t]he line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost”;80 
 “all of the surrounding circumstances . . . [including the defendant’s] physical 
and mental state”;81 
 “‘voluntariness’ . . . describe[s] an internal psychic state” and involves an 
“internal, ‘psychological’ fact.’”82 
Elsewhere, however, Frankfurter seems to abandon concern for the individual’s 
                                                                                                     
 74.  367 U.S. 568 (1961).  Frankfurter was writing the Court’s lead opinion, and it was not well 
received by some.  Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result of the case but accused Frankfurter of 
rendering an advisory opinion.  The dissenters approved of Frankfurter’s analysis but not his result. 
 75.  Id. at 606 (“[J]udgment as to legal voluntariness vel non under the Due Process Clause is drawn 
from the totality of the relevant circumstances of a particular situation . . . .”).  
 76.  “Totality of the circumstances” is the standard by which the Supreme Court considers the 
“voluntariness” of confessions.  Culombe, 367 U.S. at 606 (“[J]udgment as to legal voluntariness vel non 
under the Due Process Clause is drawn from the totality of the relevant circumstances of a particular 
situation.”); see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 
315, 323 (1959). 
 77.  Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.  
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 605, 603. 
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reaction and suggest reliance on something else: 
 “There is torture of mind as well as body . . . [a]nd there comes a point where 
this Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.”83 
 “[T]here is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal, 
‘psychological’ fact.”84 
 “[W]here [the defendant] has acted as a man would act who is subjected to such 
an extracting process . . . .”85 
 “[T]he apprehension of mental states is almost invariably a matter of induction 
. . . .”86 
 “[T]he trier of fact [must] draw inferences which the historical facts compel.”87 
 “[I]nvoluntariness . . . can never be affirmatively established other than 
circumstantially—that is, by inference.”88 
Whose “imaginative recreation”?  Induction from, or inference based on, whose 
experience?  Frankfurter mentions how “a man would act who is subjected to such 
an extracting process,” but who is that “man”the defendant, or the generic Man in 
the Street, or us?  Whose “voluntariness” is really at stake?  Frankfurter seems, 
perhaps unintentionally, to befog the question.  To clarify it, I start first by asking, 
can we know what a particular defendant was sensing?   
A partial answer to that question lies with a psychological phenomenon known 
as “empathic inference,” which is the “‘everyday mind reading’ that people attempt 
whenever they want to perceive other people’s thoughts and feelings.”89  A measure 
of the success of such mind reading attempts is called empathic accuracy, which has 
been defined more precisely as “accuracy in inferring the specific content of other 
people’s thoughts and feelings.”90  The results of several psychological studies of 
empathic accuracy in two-person interactions have enabled researchers to estimate 
that the average degree of such accuracy for pairs of strangers chosen at random is 
about 20%; for close, same-sex friends about 30%; and for married couples about 
35%.91  In other words, people’s ability to “read” each other’s thoughts, feelings, and 
intentions is clearly limited, even in the closest of relationships.  
Those figures, moreover, indicate accuracy in the context of immediate, ongoing 
interactions: how well two people sitting and conversing in a room together can 
determine what’s going on in each other’s mind.  Judges, on the other hand, must 
assess the past experiences of the defendant and must do so at a location other than 
where the interrogation occurred.  If a high-quality video recording exists that can 
                                                                                                     
 83.  Id. at 605-06. 
 84.  Id. at 603. 
 85.  Id. at 605. 
 86.  Id. at 604. 
 87.  Id. at 605. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  WILLIAM ICKES, Measuring Empathic Accuracy, in, INTERPERSONAL SENSITIVITY: THEORY AND 
MEASUREMENT 219 (J. A. Hall & F. J. Bernieri eds., 2001). 
 90.  WILLIAM ICKES, Judging Thoughts and Feelings, to appear in J. A. Hall, M. Schmid Mast, and 
T. West (eds). THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEIVING OTHERS ACCURATELY (Cambridge U. Press, 
20__), draft on file with this author, at 2. 
 91.  Id. at 7. 
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bring that past interaction into the present, a judge might be able to approximate the 
empathic accuracy that he or she might have had if present for the interrogation. But 
that uncertainty, compounded by the mere 20% degree of empathic accuracy that 
face-to-face strangers achieve in general, mandates against relying on the notion of 
empathy as a vehicle for determining constitutional rights.92 
Justice Frankfurter may have realized that too, because nowhere in Culombe 
does he suggest that empathy should play a role in this field.  Instead, he employs 
terms of strict logic: induction and deduction (i.e., inference: “imaginative 
recreation” and “what we know as men”).  This, he maintains, will enable one to 
determine the defendant’s “internal psychic state” at the time of the interrogation.  
That is virtually impossible.  The particular form of reasoning Frankfurter meant 
to describe is called “abductive” reasoningfilling gaps in the evidence with one’s 
own experience.  It’s how we use circumstantial evidence.  A standard Maine jury 
instruction goes like this:  You awaken in the morning to find snow on the ground.  
It was not there when you went to bed.  You have seen snow falling before and 
covering the ground, so you infer that snow must have fallen overnight.  From what 
you observe, you fill in the gapswhat you did not seeby reasoning abductively 
from what you know. 
There is another source of snow: a snow-making machine.  If you’re unaware 
that such a thing exists,93 you can’t infer the possibility that the snow is artificial.  
Your own experience limits your analysis; the scope of your “imaginative 
recreation”Frankfurter’s termis confined to your own, peculiar-to-you 
perceptions and interpretation of those perceptions.  
This means analyzing the effect of an interrogation on another person cannot be 
an objective inquiry into the effect on that person.  How would a judge’s own 
experience help determine the effect of an interrogation, for example, on the 
defendant in Culombe, who was “illiterate and mentally defectivea moron or an 
imbecile.  He spent six years in the third grade and left school at the age of sixteen. 
He ha[d] twice been in state institutions for the feeble-minded.”?94  Or consider a 
male judge trying to determine the effect of an interrogation on a woman who was 
suffering from premenstrual dysphoric disorder,95 or any judge intuiting what John 
Dillinger’s “internal psychic state” might have been during an interrogation. Except 
for the ultra-rare occasion when the judge’s and the defendant’s experiences and 
personalities coincide, Frankfurter’s assertion that logic is a means to determine the 
defendant’s “voluntariness” is false.   
This is another way of illustrating why Justice Levy’s attempt to know what 
Wiley underwent during the interrogation was a shot in the dark,96 and it is the 
ultimate basis for my argument against trying to assess whether a confession was a 
                                                                                                     
 92.  I owe the information in this and the previous paragraph to Dr. William Ickes, Distinguished 
Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Texas at Arlington, who edited this portion 
of the article for me. 
 93.  And did not hear it overnight; you slept soundly. 
 94.  Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 639 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).  Other factors, such 
as prolonged custody and repeated questioning also contributed to the Court’s decision. 
 95.  See supra note 22. 
 96.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
2016] COMMON SENSE AND “VOLUNTARY” CONFESSIONS 141 
defendant’s “free choice.”  Not only is it impossible to determine whether such a 
thing as a “free choice” exists, or whether someone can exercise such a choice, but 
it’s immaterial to our assessment of other peoples’ conduct.  The only question we 
can address is how we believe we would react to what we have learned about the 
other person’s experience, if we can even know.  Given the gap in the evidencewe 
can’t burrow into the other person’s psyche to find out what was going onwe fill 
that gap by examining ourselves.  Ignoring Frankfurter’s intellectualization, we rely 
on our own wisdom, i.e., “the faculty of making the best use of knowledge, 
experience, [and] understanding.”97 
This approach to confessions is the same as the method by which we assess a 
person’s mens rea.  The fact finderjurors in this exampledetermine the facts, 
based upon all of the information the parties give themwhich may or may not 
include the defendant’s character, age, health, education, and other things that make 
up, in the Supreme Court’s words, “the totality of the relevant circumstances.”98  
From the facts they find, the jurors infer the intent from their own experience with 
human behavior.   
Consider the Boston Marathon bombing case.  The jurors would not have 
examined the inner workings of Tsarnaev’s mind, and we do not expect them to have 
done so.  Nobody asked them to consider such Frankfurterian concepts as the 
defendant’s “internal psychic state” or his “internal, ‘psychological’ fact[s].”99  
                                                                                                     
 97.  WEBSTER’S, supra note 9, at 2099. 
 98.  “Totality of the relevant circumstances” is the standard by which the Supreme Court considers 
the “voluntariness” of confessions.  See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 606 (holding that “judgment as to legal 
voluntariness vel non under the Due Process Clause is drawn from the totality of the relevant 
circumstances of a particular situation.”).  See also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (citing 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) 
(“totality of the situation”).  In a criminal trial before a jury the consideration of circumstances is 
controlled by relevancy.  In a jury-waived trial, relevancy applies to the determination of guilt in the same 
way as it applies to the determination of “voluntariness”: the judge considers what counts and disregards 
what does not. 
     99.  The Tsarnaev jury instruction on mens rea was not publicly available at the time of this writing.  
Nor has the First Circuit adopted a jurisdiction-wide pattern or standard instruction on the issue.  
(Tsarnaev was tried in a federal District Court in Boston, within the First Circuit.  I wrote to the judge 
who presided in the Tsarnaev trial, Hon. George A. O’Toole, Jr., requesting information about the mens 
rea instruction, but received no response.) 
  What follows is the proposed instruction on intent and knowledge from KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, 
JAY E. GRENIG, AND WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (Fifth 
Ed., West, 2000) § 17.07 at 622: 
The intent of a person or the knowledge that a person possesses at any given time may not 
ordinarily be proved directly because there is no way of directly scrutinizing the workings 
of the human mind.  In determining the issue of what a person knew or what a person 
intended at a particular time, you may consider any statements made or acts [done] 
[omitted] by that person and all other facts and circumstances received in evidence which 
may aid in your determination of that person’s knowledge or intent. 
 You may infer, but you are certainly not required to infer, that a person intends the 
natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.  It is 
entirely up to you, however, to decide what facts to find from the evidence received during 
this trial. 
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Rather, having been presented with “the totality of the circumstances” of the case, 
they had to infer from what Tsarnaev did that he must have intended to kill people.  
The jury’s inquiry was this: what would they themselves, having “occup[ied]” Alice 
Munro’s “space in the world,” have been intending if they’d done what Tsarnaev 
did. To be sure, the jurors were instructed to find Tsarnaev’s intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that formula involves the intellectual exercise of excluding a 
doubt for which one may ascribe a reason.  But the foundation for a reasonable doubt, 
or excluding the same, is experience and the common sense that experience 
cultivates.100  
Intent, of course, is rarely the issue in confession law, because nearly everyone 
who confesses intends to do sothe defendants in Brown intended to confess.  The 
issues in confession law are what prompted or induced that intenti.e., why the 
defendant confessedand that question’s correlative, whether the police improperly 
induced the statement. 
Why the defendant confessedmotiveand intentthe mens rea for a 
crimemay be different intellectual concepts, but that is immaterial for the purposes 
of this discussion. We did not ask the Tsarnaev jurors to inspect the defendant’s 
mental goings-on when considering the intellectual element of that crime.  They 
aren’t mind readers.  Changing the inquiry from mens rea to motive doesn’t turn any 
fact finder into a telepathist.  All we have to go on is what we know. 
B.  The Law Court’s Application of the Supreme Court’s Standard. 
That is precisely how Justice Levy reached his decision.  His summary: 
We would need to disregard both experience and common sense to conclude that 
Detective Bosco's concrete representation of a short jail sentence followed by 
probation in exchange for Wiley's cooperation was not the primary motivating force 
for the ensuing confession[ ]101  
had nothing to do with Wiley’s own “voluntariness,” and everything to do with 
Levy’s. 
This raises a further problem.  Given our inability to place ourselves in the mind 
of a defendant, judges who maintain that they have done so run headfirst into an age-
old legal axiom.  Our Rules of Evidence generally discredit testimony that is not 
based on personal knowledge:  “[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless . . . the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”102  Since nobody can know what 
someone else felt in the past, testimony based on a witness’s claim that he or she 
does know would be as inadmissible as a psychic’s.  How ironic it is, then, that our 
Law Court, claiming psychic powers, should base the determination of constitutional 
                                                                                                     
Observe that this prescription opens with the axiom “there is no way of directly scrutinizing the workings 
of the human mind.”  That, of course, is the very thing which Justice Frankfurter claimed to do in Culombe, 
and which Justice Levy asserted he was doing, and Justice Alexander advocated doing, in Wiley. 
 100.  If the jurors cannot put themselves into the circumstances the evidence describes, they may be 
unable to reach an accord on the mens rea.  Such might well be the case with a jury dealing with someone 
like Culombe’s criminal intent. 
 101.  See Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 30, 61 A.3d 750. 
 102.  ME.R. EVID. 602. 
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rights on a type of assertion that has long been discredited as inherently unreliable.   
So I disagree both with Justice Levy’s assertion that Wiley’s “voluntariness” 
counts, and with Justice Alexander’s claim that “the court’s focus must be on the 
effect of the officer’s alleged inducements on the defendant himself.”103  As I explain 
in the next section, that assertion and that claim exemplify the argot in this field from 
which the Law Court must distance itself. 
C.  Considering the Interrogation Methods of the Police. 
If a tenet of confession lawreading the mind of the defendantis a fiction, is 
it even possible to establish a standard upon which to determine the admissibility of 
a confession?  My answer, however ironic it may seem, is to study case law. 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Goals. 
Let me start by discussing the Supreme Court’s two, somewhat inconsistent 
objectives in this field.  First, of course, it means to enable people to decide for 
themselves whether they want to confess. 
The Court’s second objective, and notwithstanding the first, is to let the police 
persuade the defendant to confess: 
The police may be midwife to a declaration naturally born of remorse, or relief, or 
desperation, or calculation. If that is so, if the "suction process" has not been at the 
prisoner and drained his capacity for freedom of choice, does not the awful 
responsibility of the police for maintaining the peaceful order of society justify the 
means which they have employed?104 
How the police “midwife” confessions involves a spectrum of methods, from 
whipping (Brown v. Mississippi), to waiting them out (the Russian Inspector).  Some 
methods are permitted, others not, where to draw the line has never been certain.105 
I will not attempt to draw it here.  What I will do is describe the distortions of reason 
that proceed from attempts to build a constitutional doctrine upon the imaginary.  
Nothing better illustrates the sophistry embedded in confession law than the 
Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Villalpando,106 that Justice Alexander 
quoted in his dissent.107  Referring in the opening phrase to the defendant’s burden 
on appeal, the federal court said, 
For [the defendant] to succeed here [on appeal], he has to establish that his 
interrogator made him a promise that was materially false and thus sufficient to 
overbear his free will . . . The reason we treat a false promise differently than other 
somewhat deceptive police tactics (such as cajoling and duplicity) is that a false 
                                                                                                     
 103.  Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 36, 61 A.3d 750 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
 104.  Culombe, 367 U.S at 576. 
 105.  See id. at 601: “[I]t is impossible . . . to attempt precisely to delimit, or to surround with specific, 
all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement officers in obtaining 
confessions. No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation has been 
evolved.” 
 106.  588 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 107.  Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 40, 61 A.3d 750 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
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promise has the unique potential to make a decision to speak irrational and the 
resulting confession unreliable.108 
That statement is nonsense: 
a.  The appellate court does not pause to define “free will.”  That, the court 
apparently believes, needs no attention.   
b.  Having failed to explain what “free will” is, the court also fails to explain what 
it takes to “overbear” it.  Nor, apparently, has the court considered the prerequisite 
I mentioned above, determining the state of the defendant’s “free will” as it existed 
before the police began tampering with it.109 
c.  Why does some duplicity make a statement irrational whereas other duplicity 
does not?110  If the officer falsely asserts that the suspect’s accomplice has already 
confessedsomething the Supreme Court permits111and the suspect then 
confesses, the defendant’s choice to do so is no less rationalno less 
reasonedthan it would be if the offer involved leniency.112 
  Nor does the truth or falsehood of the same formal inducement make a 
difference.  Consider this: the interrogator has made an offer of leniency, and the 
suspect has accepted it and confessed, and: 
  the officer had authority to offer leniency; or  
  the officer lacked authority to offer leniency; or 
the officer lacked authority to offer leniency but, after the confession, obtained 
it; or 
  the officer had authority to offer leniency but, after the confession, lost it. 
The rationality of the choice never changes; whether the offer is true or not has no 
effect on the defendant’s thought processes.  What is doubly bizarre about the 
federal court’s proposition is the implication that the birth of the authority to make 
the offerits legitimizationafter the confession renders the initially “irrational” 
statement “rational” (and vice versa for the authority’s extinguishment).  Perhaps 
the Seventh Circuit is employing some legal version of Schrödinger’s cat?113   
d.  For the same reason, the reliability of a confession is unrelated to the truth or 
falsity of a promise.  Even the Supreme Court conceded that.114  
                                                                                                     
 108.  Villalpando, 588 F.3d at 1128 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 
623, 630 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 109.  The Seventh Circuit is not to blame for this problem.  See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602:  “[I]f his 
will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his 
confession offends due process.” 
 110.  See infra text accompanying note 120. 
 111.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (“The fact that the police misrepresented [that a 
codefendant had confessed] is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise voluntary 
confession inadmissible.”). 
 112.  This, notwithstanding that the first may be an act of surrender, with an implicit hope for mercy, 
rather than an acceptance of express mercy.   
 113.   “Schröedinger’s cat” is a paradox of quantum physics, in which something can be both dead and 
alive at the same time, and only “dies” when it is observed.  There is a good MinutePhysics description 
of it on YouTube.  The metaphor here is that the confession is both rational and irrational until the officer’s 
authority is determined. See generally John Gribbin, SCHRÖDINGER’S KITTENS AND THE SEARCH FOR 
REALITY (Little Brown & Co. 1995). 
 114.  See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (noting that “in many of the cases in which 
the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use 
2016] COMMON SENSE AND “VOLUNTARY” CONFESSIONS 145 
The real reason why some duplicity renders a confession inadmissible, while other 
duplicity does not, has nothing to do with “voluntariness.”  The reason is that some 
duplicity is unfair, while other duplicity is less unfair.  But judges flinch at 
acknowledging such thinking so they fancy it up. 
2.  The Law of Rules and the Law of Standards. 
In fact, however, fairness, like common sense, is a fundamental element of good 
law.  Those two concepts form the basis for something called the law of standards, 
which is the little-acknowledged flipside of the coin bearing the law of rules.  The 
latter is hyper-logical black letter law, e.g. most of the Restatement of Agency, most 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, and motor vehicle and traffic statutes.  The former 
is equity, e.g. specific performance, much of divorce law, and the unconscionability 
and good faith provisions of the U.C.C.115  Call it left-brain versus right-brain 
reasoning; they are equally important.116 
Some will argue that the law of standards is arbitrary.  They miss the point: the 
law of rules is itself arbitrary, because it can impose results we do not condone.117  
The Law Court employed just such an approach recently when it decided that the 
District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the maternity of a child.118  
The plaintiffs were the intended parents of a child born to a gestational carrier.119  
Their declaratory judgment action asked the court to declare that the intended mother 
would assume the carrier’s status as the legal mother of the child.  The trial judge 
refused on jurisdictional grounds, and was right: no statute in Maine, either expressly 
or intentionally, gave the District Court authority to declare any such thing.  
The Law Court understood that subject matter jurisdiction is something it cannot 
fabricate.  But to avoid an intolerable alternativeunfairness to a motherless child 
and her hopeful but unfulfilled parents, soon to be followed by more as the use of 
gestational carrying increasesthe court employed language out of the Uniform Act 
on Paternitypaternity, you understandand fabricated it anyway.120 
                                                                                                     
of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt 
of the truth of what the defendant had confessed.”). 
 115.  See, e.g., 11 M.R.S. § 2-302 (2014). 
 116.  For an extraordinary discussion of the relationship between the law of rules and the law of 
standards, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976). 
 117.  Standards also provide room in the law for behaviors we admire but that the logic of rules doesn’t 
accommodate, such as altruism, courage and loyalty. 
 118.  See Nolan v. LaBree. 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923.   
 119.  A gestational carrier is a person who bears a child that is genetically unrelated to heri.e. the 
egg that was conceived came from a different woman.  A surrogate mother, on the other hand, is a person 
who bears a child who was conceived with her own egg.  In each case, the birth mother carries and bears 
the child with the intention that another person will parent the child. 
 120.  Maine’s version of the Uniform Act on Paternity is 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1551-1570 (2014).  The court 
quoted from section 1556: “The District Court has jurisdiction over an action to determine parentage.  
There is no right to demand a jury trial in an action to determine parentage.”  The court did not explain 
how “parentage” could refer to the person giving birth in a statute whose sole intent was to identify and 
assign responsibilities to the person not giving birth. 
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When standards control decisions, judges should say so.  In that maternity case, 
the Law Court should at least have acknowledged that the legislature had created a 
dilemma for the court by dropping the ball.121  Ignoring the obvious, and 
propounding doubletalk like “a false promise has the unique potential to make a 
decision to speak irrational and the resulting confession unreliable,” bruises 
credibility and jeopardizes a decision’s usefulness in the future.   
3.  Relying on Case Law. 
How, then, do we determine what is a fair interrogation technique?  We think 
we know it when we see it, but our perceptions are not objective.  So the best way to 
do itthe most objective wayis by resort to case law.   
It may seem ironic that, on the one hand, I criticize American courts for pursuing 
the non-entity of “free will,” and the impossible objective of determining 
something’s prior effect on someone else while, on the other hand, suggesting that 
decisions based on such snipe hunts should provide a guide to later rulings.  I do so 
because (1) notwithstanding jargon, what have probably controlled many if not all 
decisions are unspoken considerations of fairness, (2) over time such considerations 
have more or less gelled into coherence, and (3) case law is the best measure we 
have.  As in other fields in which fairness is a controlling issue—the division of 
marital property between divorcing spouses is an example—case law may be all we 
have to render an initially subjective analysis as objective as possible. 
Moreover, case law can establish clear rules.  Brown drew one: torture’s 
unconscionable.   Colorado v. Connelly, a 1986 Supreme Court decision,122 drew 
another.  In Connelly, the defendant walked up to a police officer and said he wanted 
to talk about a murder he had committed.  After the police gave Connelly the 
Miranda warnings twice, he told them whom he had murdered and took them to the 
                                                                                                     
I have this confession to make:  I submitted an amicus curiae brief in LaBree in which I expressly 
advocated using, for the purpose of deciding maternity, the language from the Act on Paternity that the 
Law Court relied on.  So blame me (and whatever other non-judicial participant who may have made the 
same argument) for suggesting it.  As an advocate, however, I did not argue against my argument. More 
importantly, I also said that 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5953 and 5957 authorized the District Court  
To issue declaratory judgments, and thereby to “declare rights, status and other legal 
relations.”  This includes the authority to issue a judgment that “will remove an 
uncertainty”  such as which of a variety candidates will be the parents.   
See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Supreme Judicial Court Docket no. Pen-11-393 at 7. 
  Ironically, the legislature has since repealed (effective in 7/1/16) the very languageand only the 
language  the court quoted in support of its decision.  The statute will read: 
The District Court has jurisdiction for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of 
pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, support or funeral expenses for 
legitimate children and all remedies for the enforcement of these judgments apply. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for future education and 
support. All remedies under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act are available for 
enforcement of duties of support under this subchapter.  P.L. 2015, ch. 296, § 1556.   
 121.  The court has done just that in the past.  See Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 
1976).  There, the court urged the legislature to pass what ultimately became the Maine Tort Claims Act 
(14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118) with this threat: “We will no longer dismiss actions in tort brought against the 
State or its political subdivisions solely on the basis of governmental immunity.” 
 122.  479 U.S. 157.   
2016] COMMON SENSE AND “VOLUNTARY” CONFESSIONS 147 
scene of the crime.  None of the officers involved in this encounter perceived any 
disability in the defendant.  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
summarized the evidence at the suppression hearing: 
[A] psychiatrist testified that the defendant was suffering from chronic 
schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at least as of August 17, 1983, the day 
before he confessed. Metzner's interviews with respondent revealed that respondent 
was following the "voice of God." This voice instructed respondent to withdraw 
money from the bank, to buy an airplane ticket, and to fly from Boston to Denver. 
When [the defendant] arrived from Boston, God's voice became stronger and told 
[the defendant] either to confess to the killing or to commit suicide. Reluctantly 
following the command of the voices, respondent approached Officer Anderson and 
confessed.123  
The trial court ruled the confession inadmissible, and the Colorado Supreme Court 
sustained, notwithstanding that there was no evidence of any police “coercion” of 
any sort: 
[N]o state action is involved in the accused's making an admission of guilt to a 
private citizen. State action enters the picture, however, when a trial court permits 
the prosecution at a jury trial to utilize as evidence of guilt a confession which is 
extracted under circumstances that so overbear the individual's will as to render the 
statement involuntary, that is, "not the product of a rational intellect and a free 
will."124 
The Supreme Court reversed: “[A]bsent police conduct causally related to the 
confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived 
a criminal defendant of due process of law.”125   
Brown and Connelly describe opposing boundaries in confession law: 
unconscionable police behavior rendering the confession constitutionally 
inadmissible, versus the absence of police behavior with a corresponding absence of 
constitutional evidentiary consequence.126  At first impression, those decisions 
focused not on why the defendant confessed but on what the police did.  But there’s 
more.  The boundaries the cases set represent the two opposing principles at stake: 
in Brown, the protection of defendants, who face the oppressive force of the 
government, and in Connelly, the public right to the “security of all.”127   
Assuming those decisions mark the peripheries of the spectrum of the Supreme 
Court’s confession doctrine, they encompass a bewildering array of decisions for and 
                                                                                                     
 123.  Id. at 161. 
 124.  People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 
307 (1963)). 
 125.  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164. 
 126.  Whether the reliability of the confession would affect its admissibility would be governed by 
Colorado’s Rules of Evidence. Id. at 167. 
 127.  “[The security of all” is from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained it this way: “[J]urists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the 
exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription 
of what concededly is relevant evidence.”  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166 (citing United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976)). These interestsprivate versus publiccounterbalance each 
otherexcept in Maine, as I will discuss in the next section of the article, following note 139. 
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against the exclusion of defendants’ admissions. I can’t describe the ins and outs of 
those decisions here; refer to the LaFave Criminal Procedure treatise for the 
specifics.128 LaFave’s summary, however, is helpful.  Confession cases generally 
address: 
 Whether the confession was provoked by police using methods that may not 
affect its reliability but are intolerable anyway; or  
 Whether the confession was provoked by police using methods that may not 
have rendered it unreliable but are intolerable anyway; or  
 Whether the confession was obtained “under circumstances in which the 
defendant’s free choice was significantly impaired, even if the police did not 
resort to offensive practices.”129 
 The first category depends on facts and intuition.  The facts include “all of the 
circumstances” that led up to the confession.130  Intuition tells us whether or not the 
police behavior may have distorted the truth of the confession.  Whatever conclusion 
we reach is based on our own experience.   
The second category depends on the facts and fairness.  Given what the police 
did to provoke the confession, was it fair?  Highfalutin rhetoric aside, that is what 
Brown v. Mississippi, Culombe v. Connecticut, Miranda v. Arizona, and all the rest, 
are about, and it is the only thing that explains Wiley.  What is fair or not is an opinion 
derived from our experience. 
The last category depends not on whether “the defendant’s free choice was 
significantly impaired,” because “free choice” can’t be determined.  When the police 
have behaved properly, the only basis for the exclusion of a confession is a concern 
for fairness.  Connelly again:  “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to 
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the 
use of evidence.”131   
Nothing illustrates these principles better than Culombe itself.   The defendant, 
who had spent six years in the third grade and had twice been institutionalized for 
being “feebleminded,” was held in custody—a “carefully controlled 
environment”132—for four days, questioned every day, not given a lawyer after he 
asked for one, not told he had the right to remain silent, not taken promptly to a 
magistrate as Connecticut law required, and charged initially with a misdemeanor as 
a ruse to keep him away from a magistrate while the police investigated the murder 
he was soon to be accused of.  The police, in short, employed everything but physical 
abuse to produce the confession. 
Frankfurter concluded that “this man’s will was broken Wednesday 
afternoon.”133  He, with an intellect the size of Rhode Island, purported to assess the 
“will” of someone who had failed third grade at least five times.  He, who never 
paused to determine what this “feebleminded” defendant’s “will” was at the 
                                                                                                     
 128.  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 6.2(c). 
 129.  Id. § 6.2 (b) at 614. 
 130.  See infra note 139. 
 131.  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). 
 132.  Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631 (1961). 
 133.  Id. at 634. 
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beginning of the interrogation, was nevertheless certain that it “was broken 
Wednesday afternoon.”134 
Intellect Frankfurter might have had, but sophistry this certainly was.  Culombe 
reversed the defendant’s conviction because the police had treated him in an 
unconscionable manner.  If Frankfurter had only said that, we might not find 
ourselves in the morass I’m writing about.  We’d know that everything depends on 
the law of standards in general, and fairness in particular, and we’d realize that 
whatever objectivity exists in this field at all is found in case law. 
Common law will not, of course, resolve all debates; cases will arise without 
precise factual antecedents, and people canand in this field frequently dodiffer 
about standards.  Nor will common law provide the police with as much definition 
as they ought to haveand as Miranda attempted to give themof the limits of their 
interrogations.  But it’s something, and better than requiring the police to make an 
“individualized assessment of the defendant’s state of mind.”135  For example, after 
Wiley, Detective Bosco will know better than to make an unauthorized offer to 
ameliorate a suspect’s sentence.  Moreover, those law enforcement agencies that 
employ interrogation protocols such as the Reid Technique136 can adapt their 
procedures to judicial doctrine.  And lawyers, at least, are familiar with this approach, 
because it’s the caselaw method they encountered in law school: determine the 
controlling legal principles, consider all the facts and circumstances of the present 
case, compare them with appellate decisions involving similar facts and 
circumstances, and advocate for or against the precedent.137  Whenever it’s a close 
call it is appropriate, as in all criminal law, that the State lose.  
D.  Reflection 
For decades, state and federal courts have attempted the same sort of 
“voluntariness” analysis as Villalpando.138  In this field of law, the only 
jurisprudential virtue has been constancy. 
Culombe has never been overturned and, in fact, it served as the Supreme 
Court’s paradigm, twelve years later, for determining the “voluntariness” of those 
                                                                                                     
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See the discussion supra in the text accompanying note 60. 
 136.  See Douglas Starr, The Interview: Do Police Interrogation Techniques Produce False 
Confessions?, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2013/12/09/the-interview7 (writing that “John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., trains more interrogators than 
any other company in the world. Reid’s clients include police forces, private security companies, the 
military, the F.B.I., the C.I.A., and the Secret Service—almost anyone whose job involves extracting the 
truth from those who are often unwilling to provide it. The company’s interview method, called the Reid 
Technique, has influenced nearly every aspect of modern police interrogations, from the setup of the 
interview room to the behavior of detectives.”) 
 137.  And lawyers know to turn to treatises when they need guidance.  I have referred to LAFAVE, 
supra note 8, many times during the preparation of this article. 
 138.  For a general overview see LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 6.2 (c) at 629-36.  Suffice it to say that 
federal and state courts have a lamentably scattered history of determining what kind of police trickery is 
okay, what kind amounts to “coercion,” what renders a confession either unreliable, “involuntary” or both, 
and why.   
150 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
who consent to warrantless searches.139 But that’s inconsequential because 
Frankfurter’s “voluntariness” is a Questing Beast, and rendering it useful would be 
a fanciful achievement.   
Will a resort to case law offend the federal jurisprudence of “free choice” and 
“voluntary” confessions?  No, because the federal courts have encased themselves 
in a structure of pure glass.  Until they provide us with a coherent method of proof, 
federal judges can have no quarrel with any state court that tries a different approach, 
provided such court achieves results reflecting federal case law.  Nor can the federal 
bench dispute the ultimate objective:  fairness to both the defendant and the public.   
The Law Court should do as the federal courts do, not as they say. 
IV:  THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Justice Levy introduced the controlling law of confessions in Wiley thus: “A 
confession is admissible in evidence only if it was given voluntarily, and the State 
has the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.”140 
The reason why the State must prove “voluntariness” beyond a reasonable doubt 
is because, in its 1972 decision, State v. Collins,141 the Law Court decided to bump 
up the federal requirement that the prosecution prove the “voluntariness” of a 
confession by a preponderance.142  That decision is flawed for three reasons.   
A.  Proving “Voluntary” Behavior.   
 Here is how the court explained its decision: 
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, as a limitation upon 
government, provides its own inherent evidentiary exclusionary doctrine predicated 
upon 'voluntariness.' It reflects a high priority commitment to the principle that 
excluded as available to government is any person's testimonial self-condemnation 
of crime unless such person has acted 'voluntarily' i.e., unless he has 'waived' his 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by choosing, freely and 
knowingly, to provide criminal self-condemnation by utterances from his own lips. 
. . . [T]o confirm and preserve the value reflected in the constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination we must minimize the risks of allowing legal 
effectiveness to 'non-voluntary', or 'involuntary', testimonial self-condemnation 
even at the expense of producing a loss of evidence which might have probative 
                                                                                                     
 139.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973).  Culombe was cited as authority 
again in 1985: Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).   In 1986, the Court distinguished Culombe by 
holding that determinations of voluntariness are legal, not factual, conclusion, notwithstanding that Justice 
Frankfurter had said that judges must find the “psychological fact[s]” that produced a confession.  Miller, 
474 U.S. at 115-16. Miller illustrates another, associated issue. That case decided whether a state court’s 
finding that a confession was “voluntary” is an issue of fact, about which federal courts must defer to the 
state court’s determination, or an issue of law, which gives federal courts de novo review power.  Id. at 
453.  The Supreme Court opted for the latter.  Given the means by which courts necessarily determine 
“voluntariness,” however, the answer has to be that such determinations are factualjust like a jury’s 
determination of criminal intent. See the discussion about proving intent supra at note 99. 
 140.  State v. Wiley, 2013 ME 30, ¶ 15, 61 A.3d 750 (citing State v. McCarthy, 2003 ME 40, ¶12, 819 
A.2d 335). 
 141.  297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972).  
 142.  See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 
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value; such was the price that our society had chosen to pay when it conferred 
constitutional protection upon the privilege against self-incrimination.143 
Missing from the decision is any indication that the court comprehended the thing it 
was now requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.144  Proving 
“voluntariness,” it seems, is the same as proving the result of a blood-alcohol test. 
B.  The Warren Court’s Influence. 
The decision to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt occurred during an era 
when criminal defendants’ rights were in the ascendancy.  The decade leading up to 
Collins saw the Supreme Court issue a string of decisions favoring the procedural 
rights of accused individuals in their struggles against “hostile forces”145 of the 
government.  They included: 
1961: Culombe v. Connecticut146 
   Mapp v. Ohio147 
   Rogers v. Richmond148 
1963: Gideon v. Wainwright149 
   Douglas v. California150 
   Haynes v. Washington151 
   Lynumn v. Illinois152 
1964: Aguilar v. Texas153 
   Beck v. Ohio154 
   Escobedo v. Illinois155 
                                                                                                     
 143.  Collins, 297 A.2d at 626-27. 
 144.  Nor did the Supreme Court in the decision upon which Collins rested, Lego v. Twomey. 
 145.  Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 (1961). 
 146.  Id. (holding a confession “involuntary” where a person who was “mentally defective of the moron 
class” was questioned intermittently from Saturday until Wednesday without an attorney, even though he 
requested counsel, and without an arraignment required by state law). 
 147.  367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending to the states the obligation to honor the Fourth Amendment).   
 148.  365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (holding that “[t]he attention of the trial judge should have been 
focused, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, on the question whether the behavior of the State’s law 
enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not 
freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner 
in fact spoke the truth.”). 
 149.  372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending to the states the obligation to provide counsel in all criminal 
cases). 
 150.  372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring counsel for indigent defendants in state appeals). 
 151.  373 U.S. 503 (1963) (16-hour incommunicado detention that violated state law rendered the 
confession inadmissible). 
 152.  372 U.S. 528 (1963) (a confession was coerced where the police said a suspect might lose custody 
of her children unless she confessed). 
 153.  378 U.S. 108 (1964) (magistrate issuing a search warrant based on a confidential informant’s 
information must be advised of the basis for believing the informant is credible).  
 154.  379 U.S. 89 (1964) (absent probable cause to arrest, search and seizure of evidence in the arrested 
defendant’s car unconstitutional). 
 155.  378 U.S. 478 (1964) (the investigation had focused on the defendant, who was interrogated in 
custody after he had obtained counsel, with whom he asked to meet before the interrogation proceeded.  
He was prohibited from consulting counsel and then made damaging statements.  In the absence of 
counsel, defendant must be advised of right to silence). 
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   Jackson v. Denno156 
   Malloy v. Hogan157 
   Massiah v. United States158 
1965:    Pointer v. Texas159 
1966: Miranda v. Arizona160 
1967:   Katz v. United States161 
   United States v. Wade162 
1968: Duncan v. Louisiana163 
   Bruton v. United States164 
1970: In re Winship165 
1972:  Coolidge v. New Hampshire166 
1972:  Furman v. Georgia167 
One scholar has asserted that the Warren court “made the constitutional law of 
criminal justice into something narrower and less useful: a constitutional law of 
criminal procedure.”168  Collins not only replicated that procedural approach, but did 
so incautiously.    
First, the decision reflects a dismissive view of the importance of confessions in 
criminal law enforcementsomething the Supreme Court had long acknowledged.  
The following is from Hopt v. Utah169 in 1884:  
A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory 
character.  Such a confession . . . is deserving of the highest credit, because it is 
presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as 
proof of the crime to which it refers.  Elementary writers of authority concur in 
saying that, while from the very nature of such evidence it must be subjected to 
careful scrutiny and received with great caution, a deliberate, voluntary confession 
                                                                                                     
 156.  378 U.S. 368 (1964) (a non-jury evidentiary hearing must be held to determine the voluntariness, 
and therefore the admissibility, of a confession). 
 157.  378 U.S. 1 (1964) (extending to the states the obligation to honor Fifth Amendment privilege). 
 158.  377 U.S. 201 (1964) (incriminating statements of defendant, obtained by secret recording device 
after he had obtained counsel, deprived defendant of the right to counsel). 
 159.  380 U.S. 400 (1965) (use at trial of transcript of complaining witness’s testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, in lieu of the witness’s live testimony at trial, deprived defendant of right of confrontation where 
the defendant did not cross-examine at the preliminary hearing or have counsel). 
 160.  384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation inherently coercive; warnings of constitutional 
rights required).  
 161.  389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless eavesdropping on suspect violated Fourth Amendment). 
 162.  388 U.S. 218 (1967) (at post-indictment lineup, defendant entitled to counsel). 
 163.  391 U.S. 145 (1968) (defendants have right to jury trial in all state criminal cases). 
 164.  391 U.S. 123 (1968) (because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the 
contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner’s guilt, admission 
of a co-defendant’s confession in the joint trial violated petitioner’s right of cross-examination secured by 
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
 165.  397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juveniles tried for offenses that would be crimes if committed by adults 
entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 166.  403 U.S. 443 (1971) (search warrant must be issued by “neutral and detached” magistrate). 
 167.  408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 168.  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 210 (2011). 
 169.  110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
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of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law, and constitutes the strongest 
evidence against the party making it that can be given of the facts stated in such 
confession.170  
Eighty years later, in Culombe, Justice Frankfurter had this to say: 
The dilemma posed by police interrogation of suspects in custody and the judicial 
use of interrogated confessions to convict their makers cannot be resolved simply 
by wholly subordinating one set of opposing considerations to the other . . . The least 
criticism of police methods of interrogation deserves to be most carefully weighed 
because the evidence which such interrogation produces is often decisive; the high 
degree of proof which the English law requiresproof beyond reasonable 
doubtoften could not be achieved by the prosecution without the assistance of the 
accused's own statement.171 
In a subsequent decision, the Court summed it up this way:  If the police lacked the 
tool of interrogation, “those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who 
were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. 
In short, the security of all would be diminished.”172 
 Compare the foregoing, all from the Supreme Court, to this from Collins:       
[W]e must minimize the risks of allowing legal effectiveness to “non-voluntary,” or 
“involuntary,” testimonial self-condemnation even at the expense of producing a 
loss of evidence which might have probative value . . . .173 
By acknowledging only that confessions “might have probative value,” the Law 
Court both understated their importance and did precisely what Frankfurter warned 
against: “subordinating one set of opposing considerations to the other.”174  It is as if 
one of the two confession-law polesConnolly‘sbarely existed, so it seems 
unlikely that our court “most carefully weighed” the public’s interest against the 
individual’s.175 
Second, the Law Court’s view of constitutional history is flawed.  Here is the 
court’s analysis again; I have italicized that portion which is untrue: 
In assessing public policy for the State of Maine and the appropriate resolution of 
the values (we) find at stake, we go beyond the objective of deterrence of lawless 
conduct by police and prosecution.  We concentrate, additionally, upon the primacy 
of the value . . . of safeguarding “‘the right of an individual, entirely apart from his 
guilt or innocence, not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances . 
                                                                                                     
 170.  Id. at 584-85 (citation omitted). 
 171.  Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 587, 576 (1961). 
 172.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503, 515 (1963)). 
 173.  297 A.2d at 627. 
 174.  Columbe, 367 U.S. at 587. 
 175.  The importance of confessions to the public interest is something the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (noting that “the 
exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription 
of what concededly is relevant evidence.”) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976)). 
See also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 
(1974). 
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We decide, therefore, that to confirm and preserve the value reflected in the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination we must minimize the risks of 
allowing legal effectiveness to “non-voluntary,” or “involuntary,” testimonial self-
condemnation even at the expense of producing a loss of evidence which might have 
probative value; such was the price that our society had chosen to pay when it 
conferred constitutional protection upon the privilege against self-incrimination.176 
I wonder what the authority for that final statement might be.  It sounds as though 
Justice Wernick, Collins’s author, was trying to bolster this new policy with the 
weight of history.  The objective of the opinion was not simply to assert the “primacy 
of the value . . . of safeguarding” the right to silence; more importantly, the opinion 
had to establish why that “value” has “primacy.”  Otherwise, the election to establish 
a higher standard of proof would be a simple preference.  Historical authority based 
on the Fifth Amendment, however, would reinforce the decision.   
But it doesn’t.  Resorting to Professor Wigmore’s treatise on evidence (then the 
pre-eminent authority on the subject) would have led Justice Wernick to this: “there 
was no historical connection . . . between the constitutional clause and the 
confession-doctrine.”177 
The Fifth Amendment was not designed to protect defendants in custody from 
confessing, but witnesses from testifying at trial.178   The early American privilege 
                                                                                                     
 176.  Collins, 297 A.2d at 626-7 (emphasis added) (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 491 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 177.  3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823, at 338-39 (Chadbourn rev. 1970), quoted in Note, Developments 
in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 960 (1966).  Collins relied principally on the majority 
opinion in Lego v. Twomey for its authority to assign a higher burden of proof to confessions, and on the 
dissent in Lego for the reason to do so.  (Lego decided what Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), didn’t 
decide: the burden of proof of “voluntariness” in state courts).  Both of Lego’s opinions assumed without 
comment the accuracy of Jackson’s explanation for the exclusion of “involuntary” confessions:   
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary 
confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of confessions that are obtained 
in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the ‘strongly felt attitude of our society 
that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the 
course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will,’ 
and because of ‘the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing 
the law; that, in the end, life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods 
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.’ 
378 U.S. at 385-86 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)).  It appears, therefore, 
that Justice Wernick disregarded Lego’s foundation in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
  In Jackson and Lego, each opinion referenced “voluntariness” (and in Jackson “overbearing” an 
accused’s “will”) without considering whether those concepts were definable.   
 178.  See Katherine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the First Amendment Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 42 AM.J.LEGAL HIST. 235, 240 (1998).  
Courts in the early 1800s spoke often of a privilege not to incriminate oneself, but never 
mentioned the Fifth Amendment in such a context. Rather, discussions of a right against 
self-incrimination referred to the witness privilege, which courts explained as a common 
law principle. 
See also John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth:  The Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination 
Doctrine 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 841 (1999) (citations omitted).  
2016] COMMON SENSE AND “VOLUNTARY” CONFESSIONS 155 
could not have applied to criminal defendants, because they had to represent 
themselves: 
So long as the accused had to conduct his own defense, there could be no effective 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Only after the rule against defense counsel was 
overcome was the privilege extended to protect the accused, a development 
overwhelmingly of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.179 
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply to state prosecutions until 
1964,180 so the assertion that the loss of evidence in state courts was “the price our 
society had chosen to pay” when it adopted the Fifth is untrue as well.  
It appears that Justice Wernick overlooked the fact that the Supreme Court has 
historically derived the “voluntary” confession doctrine from the fairness quotient of 
the Due Process Clause, without reference to the Fifth Amendment.181 
Perhaps, on the other hand, Justice Wernick meant the Fifth Amendment had, 
over time, become the criminal defendant’s shield against interrogation.  That is true 
under federal constitutional law.  Miranda v. Arizona established that:   
[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings 
                                                                                                     
In the first years of the nineteenth century, the witness privilege in American practice was 
repeatedly said to protect witnesses not just from self-incriminating testimony, but from 
testimony that revealed the witness’s infamy; cast “a shade” over the witness’s character; 
subjected the witness to civil liability, or charged the witness with a debt. 
Id. at 10, 170-1.  “Hawkins’ treatise” refers to William Hawkins’ 1721 PLEAS OF THE CROWNOTE  Id. 
 179.  See John H. Langbein, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (Oxford U. Press 2003) 
at 284.  The “rule against defense counsel” was a centuries-old principle in English law.  
[T]he judges severely restricted the scope of counsel’s activity, in order to keep pressure 
on the accused to continue to serve as an informational resource at trial. . . . [T]he judges 
allowed defense counsel into the felony trial for the limited purpose of assisting the accused 
in examining and cross-examining witnesses.  But felony defense counsel was not 
permitted to comment on the evidence or to narrate the accused’s version of the events.  
. . .  
The judge-created restriction against defense counsel addressing the jury remained 
nominally in effect until Parliament intervened in 1836 to extend full defense of counsel to 
felony defendants . . . . 
Id. at 254-5 (footnotes omitted). 
 180.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).   
 181.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 154, 163 (1986): 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Just last term, 
in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985), we held that, by virtue of the Due Process 
Clause, certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique 
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that 
they must be condemned. See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986). 
Indeed, coercive government misconduct was the catalyst for this Court’s seminal 
confession case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In that case, police officers 
extracted confessions from the accused through brutal torture. The Court had little 
difficulty concluding that, even though the Fifth Amendment did not at that time apply to 
the States, the actions of the police were “revolting to the sense of justice.” Id. at 286. The 
Court has retained this due process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
applies to the States. 
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and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is 
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.182 
That was not true, however, under Maine’s constitutional version of the Fifth 
Amendment.183  Had he carefully read the Maine precedent he cited to support his 
decision, the 1902 Law Court decision in State v. Grover,184 Justice Wernick should 
have discovered this:  
When . . . the confession was made under such circumstances as show that it was 
extorted from the respondent by some threat, or drawn from him by some promise, 
and was made to avoid the evil threatened, or to obtain the good promised, rather 
than from a desire to relieve his conscience or to state the truth, it is regarded by the 
law as involuntary, and hence not to be used against him. This rule of exclusion was 
adopted, not because such a confession has no probative force at all, but rather out 
of tenderness for the respondent, in view of his unfavorable and even dangerous 
position.185 
Exclusion of “involuntary” confessions, therefore, was Maine judicial 
policyfairness again, “tenderness for the respondent”not derived from Maine’s 
version of the right to silence.  It seems Justice Wernick was so focused on reaching 
an endestablishing a particular burden of proof in Maine confession lawthat he 
was impetuous about the means. 
To address this error, all Justice Wernick had to do was adopt Miranda‘s 
premise: custodial interrogation is now deemed to jeopardize the privilege.  He had 
the Supreme Court backing him up, so he didn’t need history.  Instead, however, he 
tried mining our state’s precedent, and was careless in doing so.  That flawed pliancy; 
the casual dismissal of the evidentiary importance of confessions; the inattention to 
the puzzlement of “free will”; all in the shadow of the defendants’ rights ethos of the 
Warren Court, suggest that State v. Collins did not articulate a reasoned policy.  What 
Collins articulated was feel-good jurisprudence.186 Justice Wernick swapped “the 
                                                                                                     
 182.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1965). 
 183.  Me. Const. art. I, § 6: “The accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against 
himself or herself . . . .”   
 184.  52 A. 757 (Me. 1902). 
 185.  Id.  Concluding that paragraph, the court said: 
In earlier days, when the respondent could not have counsel, and could not testify in his 
own behalf, the courts were ordinarily and properly quite strict in keeping from the jury 
evidence of confessions when there was any reasonable doubt of their being voluntary. 
Since the respondent is now allowed counsel, and is also allowed to testify in explanation 
of his acts and statements, there is less reason for such restrictions, and more may be left 
to the jury as to the probative force of such confessions. 
 186.  Justice Wernick was a dyed-in-the-rules judge.  (See his strict, black-letterand short-
sightedinterpretation of Maine’s Marital Property Act in Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139 (Me. 1981)).  
Why would a jurist so grounded in rules-based law as Justice Wernick write such a purely sentimental 
decision?  I have only one explanation:  it was based on patterning from the repeated and unrelenting pro-
defendant decisions of the Warren Court.  In short, it was a deterministic choice. 
  The court’s feel-good jurisprudence hit its nadir in State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120 (Me. 1982).  
In that case the defendant was in jail, accompanied by a jailer.  Id.  The defendant wanted to confess but 
the jailer told him not to.  Id.  Three times the jailer told him not to, but the defendant finally spilled his 
guts.  Id.  The confession was “involuntary,” the Law Court declared, because the defendant was upset 
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security of all” for sentiment. 
C.  Collins’s Obsolescence. 
The criminal-rights era of the Warren court187 has been succeeded by a far more 
profound, nation-wide, and decades-long, assertion of victims’ rights.  Mothers 
Against Drunk Drivers is a prominent example.  On a broader scaleand specifically 
as to Wileythe public campaign to deter domestic violence and child abuse gained 
momentum only after Collins.   
I will speak from my own experience.  I was the prosecutor for Franklin County, 
Maine, from 1978 until 1982.188  Every criminal case prosecuted under state law in 
that county for that period came across my desk.189  In not a single one was a person 
charged with domestic violence or child abuse.  
I remember only one case that involved domestic violence.  A defendant was 
accused of aggravated assault for having ordered his dog to attack a neighbor.  At 
trial, he called his wife to testify that he did no such thing, and she complied.  He 
was unaware that she had recently, and secretly, sought refuge from him in a 
battered-women’s shelter (that’s what such places were called in those days; resort 
                                                                                                     
and wasn’t thinking clearly, so his statement was not the “free choice of a rational mind.”  Id. at 1122.  
That ruling, of course, licensed every defendant who confessed thereafter to avoid his or her admission 
by claiming emotional distress.  
  Caouette was Collins on steroids:  feel-good jurisprudence based on no policy whatsoever.  Like 
Collins, Caouette bore no evidence of research: WIGMORE, available everywhere, contained multiple 
warnings, but nobody seems to have looked at it.  
  Fortunately, the Law Court distanced itself from Caouette a year later, in State v. Mikulewicz, 462 
A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983), when the court reestablished the necessity of police misconduct.  But 
Mikulewicz raised another problem.  In that decision, the court effectively reversed Caouette, but neither 
overruled it nor even acknowledged its error.  In fact, the court cited it with some approval: 
More recently . . . we held that “in order to find a statement voluntary, it must first be 
established that it is the result of defendant’s exercise of his own free will and rational 
intellect.” State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1123 (Me.1982).  The requirements 
of Catlin and Caouette are complementary and can be restated as follows: A confession is 
voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive 
police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally 
fair. 
Caouette has never been overruled, and was cited as authoritative as recently as 2013, in State v. Lowe, 
2013 ME 92, 81 A.3d 360. 
 187.  To some degree, the Warren court’s concern for criminal procedural rights and protections 
reflected the concern for racial equality of the previous decade.  “For supporters [of Miranda], 
constitutional protection for criminal defendants was a symbolic means of vindicating the promise of 
equality and humane treatment.”  Seidman, supra note 66, at 678.  Thus the argument could be made that 
the Warren court’s pursuit of criminal, procedural justice was a two-decade phenomenon, perhaps long 
enough to qualify as a “trend.” 
     Assuming that to be true, however, my criticism of Collins remains the same.  Collins addressed only 
criminal procedurenot the “promise of equality”and, within that body of law, only the 5th 
Amendment.  The Law Court was tuned exclusively to the Warren court’s criminal procedural vibes.   
 188.  The prosecutorial district I served included Franklin, Oxford and Androscoggin Counties.  I was 
the Assistant District Attorney for Franklin County.  The District Attorney’s main office was in 
Androscoggin County. 
 189.  The only state criminal offense that my office would not have handled was murder, the sole 
prerogative of the Maine Attorney General’s office.  No murders were prosecuted there during my tenure. 
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to such shelters was done in secrecy).  Nor did he learn it during that trial (that I 
know of).  I could have cross-examined her about her recent sanctuary.  That would 
have discredited her testimony, while also illustrating her husband’s propensity for 
the violence for which he was on trial.  But to avoid risking his post-trial retribution 
against her, I declined to cross-examine her.190   
Nor did I prosecute him for having beaten her.  She never complained to the 
police about him, I assume because she had no alternative to the home he was 
providing for herno support system then existed that offered her an alternative to 
returning homeand the police and I were unwilling to press forward with a 
reluctant witness.  This illustrates how primitive our view of domestic violence was 
in that era: nobody facilitated, or even considered facilitating, her power to resist her 
husband’s atrocities. 
Similarly, there was no significant public support for victims of sexual abuse.  It 
was only after I left the D.A.’s office in 1982 that the state’s first sexual-abuse 
support project was initiated191and its services were limited to female victims.  
Since then, of course, domestic violence, sexual abuse, and child abuse have become 
topics of universal concern.192 
D.  Summary. 
In comparison with the generation-long promotion of victims’ rightsvictims 
exactly like Wiley’sState v. Collins is as anachronistic now as it was unjustifiable 
when written.  The Law Court should consider why it keeps us frozen in time and 
subservient to whimsy.  
V.  THE DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND 
In much of the foregoing discussion I’ve been arguing that we can only pretend 
to know what induced most defendants to confess.  In cases of tortureBrownwe 
do know.  At the other extremeConnollywe don’t need to know.  In between, 
however, it’s a muddle, partly because this is a field governed by standards rather 
than rules, and partly because we’ve been naive about identifying what 
“voluntariness” means and whose “voluntariness” we’re considering. 
I do not intend to suggest, however, that (Brown and its ilk excepted) we can 
never know what truly provoked a defendant to confess.  We can if a credible 
defendant tells us. 
It’s the actorthe defendantwho must explain why the police went too far: 
why their not-overtly-improper procedure “coerced” him or her.  If such an 
explanation is proffered, it becomes a constituent of the stew of facts the judge must 
consider, and compare to case law, to decide whether the confession is admissible.  
                                                                                                     
 190.  The jury acquitted him.  I do not mention this case because I seek kudos as a victim-rights pioneer.  
There were two victims in that prosecution:  the wife and the neighboranother womanwho’d been 
attacked by the dog.  I achieved neither protection nor justice for either of them. 
 191.  As a member of the initial board of directors in the early 1980s, I incorporated the organization, 
which was located in Franklin County, and called Sexual Abuse Victims Emergency Services (SAVES).   
 192.  My mother used to punish me by spanking me with a hairbrush.  If she did that these days she 
would have been suspended by the N.F.L for domestic violence. 
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If it is not proffered, the judge proceeds with whatever facts have been presented.  In 
either event, the judge relies on common sense and resorts for guidance to that self-
same common law, and does not attempt to determine whether the defendant 
confessed “voluntarily.”   
Requiring the criminal defendant to establish the facts supporting the claim that 
a confession was coerced is almost the same, and as proper, as requiring the criminal 
defendant to establish the facts supporting an affirmative defense.193  According to 
Professor Wayne LaFave, the leading American authority in the field of criminal 
procedure, the defendant who asserts such a defense has the burden of producing 
evidence because 
[e]xperience shows that most people who commit crimes are sane and conscious; 
they are not compelled to commit them; and they are not so intoxicated that they 
cannot entertain the states of mind which their crimes may require.  Thus it makes 
good sense to say that if any of these unusual features are to be injected into the 
case, the defendant is the one to do it; it would not be sensible to make the 
prosecution in all cases prove the defendant’s sanity, sobriety and freedom from 
compulsion.194 
If it’s permissible to make the defendant produce evidence about compulsion 
regarding the substantive elements of the crime, it’s permissible to do so regarding a 
confession.  After all, what counts in the end is whether a procedure makes good 
sense. 
I have qualified the foregoing by acknowledging that giving the burden of 
production on a particular issue to the defendant regarding his or her confession is 
“almost” the same as doing so for purposes of trial on the merits.  It’s not quite the 
same because, if the defendant has to testify about his or her reaction to the police 
interrogation, the defendant may be exposed to cross-examination of a wider scope, 
and his or her responses might subsequently be employed by the prosecution as 
evidence of guilt.  Whether that’s permissible has yet to be resolved.195  Therefore, a 
procedure or rule of evidence necessarily awaits crafting.196   
But, as with all of the proposals I’ve been making, that one will never materialize 
until the Law Court stops admiring our federal Emperor’s new clothes. 
                                                                                                     
 193.  See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977) (discussing the rationale 
behind allocating burdens of proof for affirmative defenses).   
 194.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8 (c) at 83 (2d ed. Thompson/West 2003) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  I acknowledge that in confession law there’s this distinction:  
interrogation in the police station, Miranda tells us, is inherently coercivecoercion is the norm.  But 
that’s a given, and does not require any production of evidence.  If there is something else about the 
interrogation, however, that (1) isn’t observable and (2) amounts to coercion from the defendant’s point 
of view, it “makes good sense” for the defendant to identify it. 
 195.  In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s 
testimony at a hearing to determine his standing to object to illegally seized evidence could not be used 
against him in the trial on the merits.  However, in U.S. v. Rosalez, 711 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2013) a 
federal appeals court held that, in the circumstances of that case, the defendant’s testimony at the 
suppression hearing was admissible against him in the prosecution’s case in chief.  See LAFAVE, supra 
note 8, § 10.5(c). 
 196.  Perhaps it already exists but I, a former prosecutor, have not heard of it.  Certainly it does not 
exist in Maine law, because the obligation to prove everything about “voluntariness,” beyond a reasonable 
doubt, rests on the prosecution. 
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CONCLUSION 
I sympathize with Justice Alexander’s criticism of Wiley’s result.  As he 
persuasively explained, there was ample evidentiary and legal support for the trial 
court’s decision, so the Law Court lacked the authority to substitute its preferred 
outcome.  The majority ignored its own law. 
At least in this field, that is encouraging.  It provides hope that the Law Court 
may at last reject the chimerical in favor of the comprehensible.  And that, once 
again, brings me full circle, to the title of this essay and common sense.  I challenge 
you to make sense of this: 
Law Court: “The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession 
was voluntary.” 
Trial Judge: “What does ‘voluntary’ mean?” 
Law Court: “It means the confession was the free choice of a rational mind.” 
Trial Judge: “What does ‘free choice of a rational mind’ mean?” 
Law Court: “That depends on the totality of the circumstances.” 
Trial Judge: “What circumstances?” 
Law Court: “It depends.” 
Trial Judge:  “Won’t you define what I have to determine before I have to 
determine it?” 
Law Court: “No.” 
Trial Judge: “But if you won’t define what ‘it’ is, how can I know whether I’ve 
judged ‘it’ properly?” 
Law Court: “Just do the best you can and we’ll decide when we get the appeal.” 
Trial Judge: “But if you won’t define ‘it,’ how can you know whether I’ve judged 
‘it’ properly?” 
Law Court: “We’ll decide when we get the appeal.” 
Trial Judge: “And I have to find whatever ‘it’ is beyond a reasonable doubt?” 
Law Court:  “Yes.” 
Trial Judge: “So I have to consider ‘circumstances’ that lack definition, and apply 
to them a standard that lacks definition, and then determine whether 
the result is ‘almost certainly true’?”197 
Law Court: “Exactly.” 
Trial Judge: “Why?” 
Law Court: “Because it’s the law.” 
                                                                                                     
 197.  “Almost certainly true” is Maine’s formula describing reasonable doubt. State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 
1108, 1116 (Me. 1980). 
